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THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES IN A TIME
OF TERROR: A COMPARISON OF THE IMPACT ON CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
AND THE UNITED STATES
Shawn Boynet
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the major legislative packages enacted by the
U.S. and Germany within the past decade to combat terrorism.
Although the September 11th attacks struck the United States, the
fact that several of the terrorists lived in Germany prior to the
attacks, demonstrates that both countries face similar threats from
terrorist organizations. In addition to sharing a similar external
threat, both Germany and America share commitments to a
democratic form of government where government power is bound by
institutional checks and balances and subject to the confidence of the
electorate.
While the fact that America helped shape the post-war
construction of Germany's political institutions and legal system led
to some convergence between the two systems, there are clear points
of divergence as well. The German conception of fundamental values,
expressed in the Basic Law, accords a central role to the value of
human dignity. Germany's constitutional jurisprudence reflects the
German preference for building a legal system around clearly
articulated, objectively ordered principles. In contrast, while the Bill
of Rights articulates a host of fundamental values such as free speech
and the right to privacy, during the first half of America's existence,
courts primarily protected property related rights.
In addition to diverse traditions of constitutional jurisprudence,
Germany and the U.S. view terrorism and national security
differently. Although for the first time in recent history, Germany
deployed troops abroad to support the U.S. effort in Afghanistan,
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Germany staunchly opposed American intervention in Iraq.1 The
most critical difference between the two countries is that America has
framed the fight against terrorism in terms of a war, while Germany
has not.2 President Bush has used a state of emergency and the
support of the American people to invoke wartime powers, enact
sweeping legislative change, and create a new cabinet level
department of homeland security. In contrast, Germany, which has a
longer experience with terrorism on its own soil, strengthened its
ability to detect and investigate terrorists, while improving
cooperative investigative efforts within the European Union (EU).
Against the backdrop of the American decision to deploy military
forces to combat terrorism and Germany's preference for non-military
options lie differences in the magnitude of the loss experienced by the
United States at the hands of the al Qaeda network. In addition to
the more than 3,000 casualties suffered on September 11th, al
Qaeda's campaign of bombing Americans around the world has
injured thousands of individuals and resulted in several deaths.3
Those numbers far exceed the casualties suffered by German citizens
at the hands of extremists in the 1970s, which led Germany to declare
a state of emergency and revise its criminal codes.4 These points of
' Ph.D. Candidate, University of Wisconsin; B.A., Cornell University, 1980;
M.B.A., University of Minnesota, 1985; J.D., University of Southern California Law
Center, 1991; M.A., University of Wisconsin, 2003. The author graciously wishes to
thank Professor Don Downs and Visiting Assistant Professor Liane W6erner for their
helpful comments to the draft. The author presented earlier versions of this paper at
Georgetown University's Center for European and German Studies as well as to the
fellows at the University of Wisconsin Law School's Institute for Legal Studies and is
grateful to the participants for their helpful suggestions. The author would also like
to thank Professor Dr. Arthur Kreuzer, Thomas Netz, and Matthias Warner of
Justus-Liebig-Universitit Giessen for their invaluable assistance, Dr. Lorenz
B611inger of the Universitat Bremen, Dr. Frank Neubacher of the Universitat-Kdln,
as well as the numerous officials at Germany's Federal Ministry of Justice, Federal
Ministry of the Interior, and the Bundeskriminalamt for their patience in answering
numerous questions.
1. While Germany did send troops to Somalia and Bosnia during the decade of the
1990s, those troops were part of an international peacekeeping effort.
2. PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, SEPTEMBER 11TH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE ANTI-
TERRORISM CAMPAIGNS OF GERMANY AND JAPAN 3 (Oct. 2001), available at
http:/www.einaudi.cornell.edul9-11/contentlpdf/pkatzenstein.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2003).
3. Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 560 (1999).
4. MIKLOS K. RADVANYI, ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 24-34 (1979).
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divergence suggest differing perspectives about the nature of threat
posed by terrorism as well as each country's perception of its role in
the world arena.
It is tempting to cast the German and American legislative
responses to terrorism solely within the context of these differences in
international outlook. To do so, however, would oversimplify the role
and construction of law. Irrespective of these differences in
international outlook, the unique political, historical, and cultural
traditions of each country profoundly shaped the law-making and
implementing processes. By studying and comparing how these
factors have influenced anti-terrorism legislation, we can begin to
understand different, and perhaps better, ways of balancing security
and human rights interests that do not bear the heavy footprint of
short-term political considerations.
This paper aims to begin to forge this understanding by
identifying similarities and differences between the anti-terrorism
legislation in both states. This article suggests that the points of
divergence in legal policy have been shaped by differences in
historical and social experience, the structure of political institutions,
and finally by diverse conceptions of fundamental values.5 The
broader question that this paper only begins to address is whether or
not the legislation enacted in both countries serves the interests of
liberal democratic societies in the twenty-first century. There is a
more fundamental question. Does the threat and nature of terrorism
justify a new wartime legal order that curbs civil liberties or can
democracies protect themselves and their constitutional values with
more measured legal reforms? Exploring origins of difference can
highlight the strengths and weaknesses in the legal strategy that
each country has chosen to combat terrorism.6 To that end, this paper
examines the balance struck between security interests and the core
principles at the heart of both societies in both states' recent anti-
terrorism legislation.
5. David Nelken, Legal Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors, in
COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 24 (Andrew Harding & Esin Oricii eds.,
2002).
6. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction to Comparative Constitutionalism,
3 CHi. J. INT'L L. 429 (2002) (describing the benefits of the study of comparative
constitutionalism).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RECENT ANTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION
A. Germany
1. The First Anti-Terrorism Package
The repeated broadcasts of the September 11th attacks moved
public sentiment not only in the U.S., but also in Germany. One day
after September 11th, Germany's Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily,
called for a review and strengthening of Germany's existing
legislation related to state security.7 The powerful televised images of
the attack fueled support for a legislative response. Despite the fact
that Germany had been fighting terrorism within its borders for
nearly thirty years, German lawmakers perceived the September l1th
attacks as a new form of terrorist threat that required a heightened
5
response.
As a result of Germany's experience with domestic terrorism,
Germany possesses a rich record of legislative efforts designed to
improve the state's ability to combat terrorism. In the decades of the
1970s and 1980s groups such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the
June 2nd Movement, and the Socialist Patients' Collective engaged in
violent activities that included bombings, kidnappings, assassinations
and armed raids of government buildings that threatened Germany's
legal order. Although the government arrested and convicted the
most prominent leaders of these terrorist groups, components of the
enacted German legislation provoked criticism within Germany and
abroad, and spurred constitutional challenges in Germany's Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BuerfG).9 Critically,
these legislative measures sparked an ongoing discussion within
Germany about the relationship between civil liberties and the right
to security.10 While ensuring state security became a basic state right
in the 1970s, the relationship of this right to other basic rights
stimulated ongoing political and scholarly debate. 1 Recently, the
7. See OLIVER LEPSIUS, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), at
http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/lepsiusenglish.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 1 (citing BVerfGE 46, 1 (prohibition of contact, no interim order); BVerfGE
46, 160 (Schleyer kidnapping); BVerfGE 49, 29 (statute of prohibition of contact);
BVerfGE 65, 1 (Census)).
10. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 1-2.
11. Id. at 2.
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EU's Schengen Agreement, which called for member states to relax
border controls, also caused Germany to reevaluate security
procedures within its borders.
In the initial aftermath of September 11th, German legislators
ignored the ongoing debate and additionally failed to question
whether an intelligence lapse permitted the attacks." At the time,
most German politicians believed that Islamic terrorists threatened
democracy, in a qualitatively different way than any group before
them. Moreover, that threat required Germany to change the legal
rules of the game. During the debate about Germany's "second
security package," Interior Minister Shily stated:
We have to be aware what place was attacked: New York is the
most international city in the world. The United Nations has its
headquarters there. More than eighty nations had citizens among
the victims. New York-a symbol for the desire for freedom in this
world, for democracy in this world-was the chosen point of attack.
Many of those who were persecuted under the terror regime of the
National Socialists or under the rule of other totalitarian systems
had sought refuge in New York. This is deeply rooted in the
historical consciousness of humanity. 13
Given that Germany has been fighting terrorism within its
borders for several decades and that regions within Europe, such as
Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, have kept terrorism
at the forefront of European consciousness, it is perhaps surprising
that Germany's ruling coalition treated this new threat as a
qualitatively different one. Yet while the terrorist attacks of the
1970s were the work of a limited number of individuals, because the
new attacks were committed by members of a world-wide network of
Islamic terrorists, as well as the devastating number of the casualties,
elevated the nature of the threat.
14
While Germans interpreted the September 11th attacks as an
attack on Western democracy, Germany did not view the attacks as a
prelude to war and rejected the American characterization of the
appropriate response, a declaration of war." Although it is an open
question how Germany would have responded to the attacks had they
occurred on German soil, it is not clear that Germany's preference for
12. Id.
13. See id., at 3 (quoting Otto Schily in the German Bundestag, 14th electoral
period, session number 209, BT-Plenarprotokoll 14/209, 20758 (B) (Dec. 12, 2001)).
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id.
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law and order would have spurred Germany to battle terrorism on a
broad worldwide front." These differences cannot be attributed solely
to differences in military capabilities. While Germany's military
capabilities do not compare to the United States' worldwide network
of military bases, as a NATO member Germany can appeal to NATO
to reinforce its military needs. To understand the differences between
the U.S. and German outlook one must search more deeply through
historical and political factors.
This difference in perspective reflects, in part, Germany's
aversion to war in the aftermath of massive destruction and carnage
of World War II. While the loss suffered on September 11th was
grave, the massive destruction and partitioning of Germany in the
aftermath of the war has perhaps made Germans and Europeans
more sensitive to the costs of war. Moreover, Europe possesses a
history of civil wars, terrorist acts, and cross-border organized crime
that many Americans cannot appreciate. As a result of these
differences, Germans framed September 11th as a heightened
terrorist threat, rather than a war.17  From a policy-making
perspective, this framing denied Germany the opportunity to
rationalize its legislative response as a justifiable wartime response
and narrowed the possible legal scope of that response.
Germany subsequently enacted two pieces of "security" or "anti-
terrorism" legislation, the first in October 2001, and the second in
January 2002. The first security package expanded the reach of penal
statutes to foreign terrorists and tightened the eligibility of provisions
in the law governing associations, which had given religious
organizations a protected legal status. It also implemented security
checks of airline personnel.
In addition, changes to Germany's Criminal Code made it easier
for the state to criminally punish foreign terrorist organizations
operating in Germany by criminalizing membership in, or support
given to, a foreign terrorist organization. Prior to these changes, in
order to be punished under §§ 129 and 129a of the Criminal Code
(StGB), a foreign terrorist organization needed to have a sub-
organization in Germany before the state could punish its members or
16. In 1998 Germany refused to admit the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan who had
used terroristic tactics on behalf of the Kurdish independence movement into the
country because of fears that his arrest in Germany would disrupt domestic law and
order. See Ralph Atkins, Bonn Will Not Seek Ocalan Extradition, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 28, 1998, cited in Wedgewood, supra note 3, at 561.
17. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 4.
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supporters. ' Enacted in the 1970s as a response to the terrorist
attacks of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and its successor group, the Red
Army Faction (RAF), § 129a StGB, was originally designed to improve
public safety by criminalizing the planning of illegal activities and
punishing such activity with stiff sentences.' 9 Its companion section,
§88a StGB, was highly controversial at the time of enactment,
because it appeared to criminalize mere intent by outlawing
"propagation of anti-constitutional action."0 Public criticism led to
the repeal of § 88a StGB in 1981; however, §129a StGB remained in
force .2
The provisions of the new law apply without restriction to any
organization located within a member country of the EU.22  For
organizations that primarily operate outside of the EU, the German
criminal law will apply if there is some personal or geographic
connection to Germany.23 In addition, the legislation added a new
offense, 129b StGB. This new section allows the state to prosecute
terrorist organizations that are organized in an EU member state
other than Germany, if the suspect is German or resides in Germany.
Prior to the enactment of this new section, the ability of German
authorities to prosecute terrorist organizations with foreign ties was
constrained because § 129a StGB applied only to German terrorist
organizations. Under § 129b StGB, individuals who are members of
European and other foreign terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda
may be prosecuted simply for being members of, or providing support
to, those organizations.
Prior to the September attacks, the reach of §129a StGB had
recently stimulated renewed political debate. Germany made a
commitment to punish criminal organizations that operated within
Germany, regardless of the location of an organization's base of
operations or criminal acts as part of an EU initiative to counter
regional terrorist activity within Europe. However, some
18. § 129 StGB (Formation of Criminal Organizations); § 129a StGB (Formation of
Terrorist Organizations).
19. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 5.
20. Erhard Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule of
Law in Germany, in COURTS, LAW & POLITICS 249, 294 (Erhard Blankenburg et. al
eds., 1996).
21. Id.
22. New Law Designed to Step Up Fight Against International Terrorism, DIE
BUNDESREGIERUNG, May 2, 2002, at http:/leng.bundesregierung.de/dokumentel
Artikel/ix_78475_475.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
23. Id.
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parliamentary factions sought to repeal the statute, because it made
providing support to an organization that had participated in terrorist
acts a strict liability crime.24 The debate centers on the fact that an
individual can be prosecuted for providing financial support to an
organization that is primarily engaged in humanitarian activities, if
that organization also sponsors violent activities.
A second initiative that sought to improve the government's
ability to fight terrorist organizations with foreign ties was the
tightening of the eligibility for the "religious privilege" found within §§
9 and 14 of the Association Act. These changes aimed to prevent
German-based organizations from supporting groups that promoted
violence. Prior to these changes, the government lacked the power to
ban extremist religious groups that used religion as a cover for
criminal activities, if those organizations promoted public religious
practices.25 While this measure was passed after September 11th,
prior to that date, there was a growing consensus that this was a
significant problem. The final key provision in the first anti-terrorism
package was a regulation issued on October 8, 2001 that improved
security checks of airline personnel.
2. The Second Anti-Terrorism Package
The primary goal of the Second Anti-Terrorism Package, enacted
on January 1, 2002, was to enhance the state's ability to detect
terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks. To support this aim, the
legislature enlarged the responsibilities of Germany's key agencies
entrusted with protecting state security: the Federal Office of the
Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fir Verfassungsschutz,
BfV), the Military Counterespionage Service (Militdrischer
Abschirmdienst, MAD), the Federal Intelligence Service
(Bundesnachrichtendientst, BND), and the Federal Criminal Police
Office (Bundeskriminalament, BKA).26 The second security package
included new security laws and amended nearly 100 acts including
the Federal Constitution Protection Act, the Federal Office of
Criminal Investigation Act, the Federal Border Guard Act, the Aliens
Act, the Asylum Procedure Act, the Aliens Central Register Act, the
24. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 5.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 7
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Security Checks Act, the Civil Aviation Act, the Passport and
Personal ID Card Acts and the Associations Act.27
The new legislation enhanced the authority of the BfV and BND
to gather data and information on individuals involved in terrorist
activities. Germany has now authorized the BfV to monitor
organizations that pose a threat to international peace and granted it
the authority to gather information on suspected terrorists.2 s This
legislation is designed to identify individuals involved in terrorist
networks by improving the flow of information between the Federal
Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees and Foreign
Authorities, as well as between the German Federal Government and
the Federal Linder.29 In addition, the legislation permits the Federal
Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees to transmit data to the
BfV when necessary to protect state security.
As a result of this new legislation, Germany's Military
Counterintelligence Service is also now authorized to gather
information on individuals who threaten world peace. However, the
government more narrowly circumscribed MAD's ability to request
data than it did the BfV. MAD can only request telecommunications
usage.30  Germany also amended its Security Clearance Check Act,
Sicherheitsueberprifungsgesetz, to allow the government to conduct
background investigations on individuals employed, or about to be
employed, in security sensitive positions vital to national defense and
the functioning of the public welfare system.3'
In the second legislative package, Germany authored the
deployment of armed air marshals employed by the Federal Border
Police on German aircraft and strengthened airport security checks.
In addition to expanding the Federal Border Police's deployment, this
legislation increased the authority of border police to question
27. Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cornerstones of Germany's Second Anti-Terror
Package, May 11, 2001, at http://www.eng.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Pressemitteilung
/ix_64084.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Cornerstones]. The
amendments to the Federal Constitution Protection Act, the Federal Intelligence
Service Act, the Military Counterintelligence Service Act, the Security Checks Act,
and § 7, T 2 of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation Act will expire in five
years.
28. The legislation authorized the agency to gather information from banks,
financial services companies, postal services providers, aviation companies, and
telecommunication companies.
29. See Cornerstones, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
2003]
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individuals. Prior to the second package's enactment, the Federal
Border Police could only stop and question individuals who were
located within a specified range of Germany's borders who could
provide information directly relevant the Border Police's specific
mandate to protect the borders. The Border Police can now request
that an individual produce identification and require individuals to
answer questions and provide information, regardless of whether or
not the information is related to a border security question.32
The Federal Criminal Police Office, which functions as Germany's
federal police force, acquired original investigative jurisdiction over
cyber-crime that poses a threat to state security or could trigger
critical consequences for the population.3 The legislation also lifted a
critical check on the scope of BKA investigations. Prior to this
legislation's enactment, the BKA could not proceed with the
investigation of a case until they verified whether or not any of the
Ldinder already possessed similar information.1
4
Amendments to the Act governing Passports and Identity Cards
(Pass- und Personalauswisgesetz) will enable Germany to add
biometric data to passports and identity cards. Special legislation to
be enacted at a future date, will limit the types of biometric data that
can be encoded on identification information and bars the government
from centrally storing these new data records.36 The primary purpose
of these amendments is to restrict the use of fake identification
information.
In the Holocaust's aftermath, one of the ways in which Germany
sought to protect religious freedom was the enactment of laws that
prevented the government from banning any group that described
itself as faith-based. After September 11th, when it became evident
that some groups were using religion as a shield to perpetrate
violence, Germany lifted those protections in a two-step process.
First, the initial legislative package more narrowly circumscribed the
religious "privilege" accorded to all faith-based groups in the Law
governing Private Associations (Vereingesetz). The second package
strengthened the state's ability to ban religious groups, ideological
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Cornerstones, supra note 27.
36. Id.
37. See KATZENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 18.
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associations, and fundamentalist-Islamic religious groups, when those
groups foster intolerance and promote terrorism.38
Germany has tightened some security precautions related to
foreigners; however, it has been unable to secure the necessary
political consensus to enact new immigration laws that balances the
state's security and labor needs.39 Although Germany has been at
times eager to attract foreign workers to the country, it has been
difficult for those workers to subsequently obtain citizenship.
Germany possesses a large population of southern Europeans who
came to Germany in large numbers in the 1950s and 1960s to help the
country rebuild and remained thereafter. In addition, many skilled
foreigners who entered Germany within the past five years remain in
Germany after having lost their jobs in the recent economic downturn.
As a result of the government's inability to achieve a consensus
on immigration policy, Germany has been left with a patchwork of
legislative enactments. After September 11th, amendments to the
Foreigners Act (Auslindergesetz) banned the entry into Germany of
individuals who threaten state security and expanded deportation
provisions. 40  Despite these enhancements, individuals may not be
denied entry, detained indefinitely, or deported simply on the basis of
a suspicious hunch. As a result of amendments to the Asylum
Procedure Act (Asylverfahrengesetz), individuals seeking asylum in
Germany may be required to provide a voice recording for
identification purposes that will enable the state to determine their
region of origin. 4' The state must inform foreigners in advance that
their voice is being recorded and the recording must be made outside
of a formal asylum hearing. Germany is also seeking to acquire the
capability to crosscheck the fingerprints of asylum seekers with crime
scene fingerprints. Finally, Germany is also taking a number of steps
to improve the government's ability to track and determine whether
or not a foreigner is residing in Germany legally. Amendments to the
Act governing the Central Aliens Register
(Ausldnderzentralregistergesetz) will upgrade computer files
containing visa applications and improve the clearance process of
individuals entering Germany.
3& Cornerstones, supra note 27.
39. Germans Reject Sweeping Immigration Law, DEUTSCHE WELLE, June 20, 2003, at
http://www.dw-world.deenglish/0,3367,1432-A-898151-1_A,00.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2003).
40. Cornerstones, supra note 27.
41. Id.
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3. Recent Legislative Activity
In the spring of 2002, the German government considered further
anti-terrorism measures, including a provision banning individuals
within Germany from raising funds and facilitating logisticalS • 42
planning for foreign terrorist organizations. Debate about the
definition of a terrorist and concern that the law could erode support
for legitimate national liberation movements initially stalled this
legislation.43 The revelation that there was a possible German
connection to an explosion outside a synagogue in March 2002, as well
as the upcoming national elections in September, muted those
concerns.
In the Spring of 2002 Germany enacted the Act on the
Management and Limitation of Immigration (Gesetz zur Steuerung
and Begrenzung der Zuwanderung), but the Federal Constitutional
Court subsequently struck the Act down on a procedural
technicality.44 This legislation proposed broad changes in Germany's
post-war immigration policy 45 liberalized Germany's immigration• • • 46
laws, actively promoted immigration , as well as sought to institute
compulsory language and citizenship classes.47 Although many key
political groups such as unions, the federation of employers, and
churches supported the Act, the Act faced stiff conservative opposition
in the Bundesrat, its higher legislative chamber, where the Schroder
42. Lucian Kim, Germany Ramps Up Legislation, CHRISTIAN Sc]. MONITOR, Apr. 25,
2002, at W7.
43. See id.
44. Id. While the bill passed the Bundestag, it encountered problems in the
Bundesrat, where the representatives from Brandenburg did not reach a consensus
on the bill. Because Article 51(3) of the Basic Law requires each Land to cast its
votes as a unit in the Bundesrat, this split ultimately created a constitutional rule
concerning the validity of the Bundesrat's endorsement of the bill. After the German
President certified the bill, six Lander challenged the Bundesrat's approval of the bill
on the grounds that Brandenburg had not voted as a bloc. As a result of this
challenge, the Federal Constitutional Court struck the Act down on procedural
grounds on December 18, 2002. Id.
45. Nina Arndt & Rainer Nickel, Federalism Revisited: Constitutional Court Strikes
Down New Immigration Act For Formal Reasons, 4 GERMAN L.J. (2003), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.comlcurrent-issue.php?id=228 (last visited Nov. 5,
2003).
46. Id.
47. Germans Reject Sweeping Immigration Law, supra note 39.
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S • 48government does not hold a majority. In June 2003, the Bundesrat
rejected the resubmitted bill, despite the fact that Germany's
overburdened pension and welfare system could benefit from the
influx of working immigrants as the German population continues to
age.49  Because strong conservative political opposition to the bill
currently exists, the modernization and liberalization of Germany's
immigration policy is at a standstill. ° The bill has been sent to a
parliamentary working group to hammer out a compromise between
the conservative parties and the Social Democrat and Green parties.51
B. United States
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
In the aftermath of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993
and the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995,
Congress attempted to comprehensively respond to the terrorist
threats with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996. 2 The primary impact of the Act was to increase the President's
authority to fight terrorism and to prohibit the financing of terrorist
organizations. The Act also revised immigrant deportation
procedures and improved regulations covering explosives, as well as
chemical and biological weapons.'3 Foreshadowing the increase in
executive power that followed September 11th, the Act affirmed the
President's power to "use all necessary means, including covert action
and military force, to destroy international infrastructure used by
international terrorists."4  Given this provision's latitude, it is
48. Arndt & Nickel, supra note 45. The Christian Democratic Union and its
Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, currently hold the majority in the
Bundesrat.
49. Germans Reject Sweeping Immigration Law, supra note 39.
50. Arndt & Nickel, supra note 45.
51. Germans Reject Sweeping Immigration Law, supra note 39. Germany also had to
wrestle with its fellow European Union members regarding EU provisions that allow
citizens of EU countries the right to work anywhere in the EU. As the EU plans to
admit a host of new eastern European members in 2004, Germany negotiated
provisions that grant citizens in new member countries the right to work throughout
the EU only after a five to seven year period. Id.
52. DAVID COLE & JAMEs X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (2002).
See also, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
53. HARRY HENDERSON, GLOBAL TERRORISM: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE GUIDE 7
(2001).
54. Id.at 73.
2003]
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arguable whether or not President Bush needed additional
congressional authorization to use military force in Afghanistan. The
legislation also amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to allow
the President to withhold foreign aid to governments that aid
terrorist states.5
The Act expanded the government's authority to combat
terrorism by cutting off sources of financial support. The Act
authorized the Secretary of State to designate organizations as
"terrorist organizations" if the organization is engaged in terrorist
activity that threatens the security of the U.S. or U.S. citizens.
6
While the previously enacted Export Administration Act had
prohibited individuals from engaging in financial transactions with
terrorist organizations, the 1996 Act expanded that prohibition to
include humanitarian assistance other than medicine or religious
• 57
materials. The Act required financial institutions that became
aware that they possessed funds belonging to a terrorist organization
to notify the Secretary of State.58
While the Act granted the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), the power to bar members of terrorist organizations
from becoming citizens and prohibited most terrorists from seeking
asylum in the U.S., the impact of these provisions on individual rights
was dwarfed by the provision that created special courts to conduct
removal proceedings. Under Title IV of the Act, Congress directed the
Chief Justice to designate five district court judges from five of the
U.S. judicial districts to create a court to conduct removal
proceedings. 59 This provision allowed any single judge in these special
removal proceedings to consider testimony presented ex parte and in
camera in reaching a determination regarding removal.0
While it is clearly reasonable for the government to prohibit
individuals intent on committing violent acts in the U.S. from
entering the country, the statute's breadth raised the specter that
guilt by association would guide exclusion decisions. While Congress
passed legislation in 1990 that removed many ideological grounds for
exclusion, under the 1996 Act, the government regained the ability to
bar individuals on the account of their association with particular
55. Id.
56. Id. at 72.
57. Id. at 72-73.
58. Id. at 72.
59. HENDERSON, supra note 53, at 73.
60. Id.
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groups whether or not an individual had committed any illegal acts.6 '
Similarly, Congress had twice refused to enact legislation to allow the
INS to use secret evidence in immigration proceedings during the
prior Bush Administration. 62 The Act increased the federal penalties
for specified terrorism crimes and expanded the scope of the weapons
and actions covered by a host of existing federal statutes.6'
Indicative of the unique role that tort litigation and money
damages play in the U.S. as a source of deterrence of future harm, the
Act stripped foreign governments, who perpetrate a terrorist act or
support to terrorists, of sovereign immunity protection. The Act
allows victims of foreign terrorism to sue a foreign government for
money damages "for personal injury or death caused by an act of
torture, extra judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
provision of material support or resources to terrorists.
'6 4
It is important to note that the Attorney General may
circumscribe this right to sue when it would compromise a criminal
investigation, prosecution or national security operation. 6' The Act
also broadened federal provisions to compensate American residents
who are victims of terrorist acts abroad. 6
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 200167
The attack on the World Trade Center's twin towers on
September 11th shocked the national psyche and created a sentiment
of vulnerability that perhaps had not been stirred since the
assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King in the
1960s. In contrast to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, this attack was
perpetrated by an enemy much more difficult to locate. Given the
destructive impact of the attack, the breadth and speed of the
legislative response was unsurprising.
One week after the September 11th attacks, Attorney General
John Ashcroft submitted an omnibus anti-terrorism proposal that
granted the government far ranging powers to fight the war the
61. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 52, at 108-09.
62. Id. at 109.
63. HENDERSON, supra note 53, at 71.
64. Id. at 71 (citing Antiterrorism Act of 1996, title II (B) (1996)).
65. Id. at 72.
66. Id.
67. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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President had declared on terrorism. Although Congress did not meet
the Bush Administration's demand that they enact the legislation
within three days, the legislature subjected the legislation to minimal
scrutiny, deliberation, or debate, and the President signed the bill into
68law on October 26, 2001.
The key objective of the Patriot Act is to improve domestic
security by enhancing the government's intelligence-gathering powers
and strengthening the government's capability to detect terrorist
activity. The Act centralizes law enforcement authority regarding
terrorist acts into the Justice Department, and empowers the
department to investigate all federal crimes related to terrorism.6'
Prior to this consolidation, the Justice Department, the Secret
Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, as well as the
Coast Guard shared responsibility for investigating related federal
crimes of violence.
Simultaneously, the Act transfers responsibility to set
requirements and priorities for the collection and dissemination of
foreign intelligence under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, from the Attorney General to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. 7 The operational authority for implementation
will continue to reside with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
As well as consolidating investigative authority, the Act amended
the criminal code to expand the legal definition of terrorism. While 18
U.S.C. §2331 previously only defined "international terrorism," the
Patriot Act amended the code to include a class of activities defined
under the rubric of "domestic terrorism." Those activities:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion;
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
68. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, INSATIABLE APPETITE: THE GOVERNMENT'S
DEMAND FOR NEW AND UNNECESSARY POWERS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 3-4 (October 2002),
at http://aclu.org./files/openfile.cfm?id=10403 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
69. John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom"
for"Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the
Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002).
70. Id. at 1091.
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(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
71States.
7
The Act enlarges the government's power to conduct searches,S 72
electronic surveillance as well as intelligence-gathering. Key
provisions of the Act that relate to intelligence gathering include:
Section 213 which grants law enforcement the authority to delay
notice of the execution of a warrant. This provision authorizes law
enforcement to covertly enter and search a residence without
notifying the occupant until an undefined "reasonable" date after law
enforcement has completed the search where "providing immediate
notice would have an adverse result . .,,;73 Section 216 which
authorizes the government to install technological devices that can
intercept all forms of internet activity, including email activity, web
page activities, and internet telephone activity of customers within a
particular internet service provider network and to convert
information relating to the target into human-readable form;74 Section
218 which allows federal law enforcement officers to monitor private
phone conversations without a warrant if the officer claims that a
"significant purpose" of the investigation is to gather foreign
intelligence; and 7* Section 416 which provides immediate funding to
implement a monitoring program of all foreign students enrolled or
participating in exchange programs with educational institutions, air
76flight schools, and language training schools.
Key final areas of reform are the provisions relating to
immigration. The Act prohibits aliens who have solicited funds or
members, or provided material support to certified terrorist
organizations, from admission to the country and states that those
activities are grounds for removal.77  The Act granted the Attorney
71. USA Patriot Act of 2001, § 802(a)(5)(A)-(C).
72. Sheetal Asrani, Security versus Liberty: Striking the Right Balance. A
Comparison of Anti-Terror Provisions in India and the United States, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1
(2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current issue.php?id=186 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2003).
73. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162
Section-By-Section Analysis, Patrick Leahy, United States Senator, at
http://www.senate.gov/-leahy/pressf200110/102401a.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003)
[hereinafter Uniting and Strengthening America].
74. See Asrani, supra note 72.
75. Uniting and Strengthening America, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 411.
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General the power to take into custody any alien whom he had
"reasonable grounds to believe" was engaged in any activity that
78
endangered national security. While section 412 of the Act
authorizes the government to hold suspected aliens for seven days
upon the Attorney General's certification, the Attorney General may
approve additional six-month periods of detention if an individual's
release threatens national security, community safety, or any
79person.
Both Germany and the United States have passed similar
legislative packages to enable their respective governments to
respond to the threat posed by terrorism. The bulk of these changes
aim to improve the ability of both governments to detect terrorists. In
addition, both countries have enlarged their definition of terrorism.
Germany has also moved to restrict protections previously awarded to
fundamentalist religious associations in an effort to prevent those
organizations from serving as refuges for terrorists. Although there
are strong similarities between these legislative packages, the role
that each country assigns to law and courts in its response to
terrorism may affect the societal impact of this legislation.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW AND COURTS
A. Counterweights to Preserve Constitutional Values
When both Germany and America responded to September 11th
by enacting broad legislative packages to combat terrorism, it sparked
debate about whether the new legislation usurped constitutional
freedoms. While much debate occurred in Germany between the
political parties during the law making process, there was little
political debate during the Patriot Act's enactment in the United
States. To the extent that there is a debate in America about the
legislation, it is spearheaded not by the political parties, but rather
interest groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Center for Constitutional Rights, as well as law professors, who have
filed lawsuits and amicus curiae briefs in pending cases. Although
politics delayed the enactment of the Homeland Security Bill, the
focus of that debate was not on how the bill infringed constitutional
rights, rather on the provisions in the bills that undercut the
bargaining power of unions.
78. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 412.
79. Emmanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the
United States: The Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
1, 11 (2002).
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To determine how this legislation will affect civil liberties in both
societies, we must not only consider the legislations' content, but also
what role courts will play in shaping the scope of the legislations'
implementation. Most importantly, the critical inquiry is whether or
not courts in both societies, if necessary, can act as counter-weights to
efforts to catch terrorists at any cost and preserve constitutional
values. To this end, this section briefly reviews the courts' evolving
role in both countries.
B. Germany
Although courts have historically not played a prominent policy-
making role in many civil law systems, Germany's turbulent political
history, distinct domestic legal tradition, and the mandate of its
Federal Constitutional Court to preserve a federal democratic state,
has ensured that the Federal Constitutional Court plays a unique role
in Germany's political system. While most scholarly attention has
been focused on the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany's other
federal high courts and their accompanying specialized senates,
function as policymakers as well.80 In order to understand what role
Germany's judicial system has played in the war on terrorism to date,
as well as to predict whether it can and will act as an effective
counterweight to legislative initiatives that sacrifice civil liberties, we
must first consider the history of the role of law in the modern
German state.
When twenty-five separate sovereign states formed the German
Empire in 1871, there was a systematic effort to adopt uniform codes
of criminal law, civil and criminal procedure, private law, and
commercial law, which culminated with the codification of the
commercial law in 1897.81 This codification established an apolitical
rule of law in Germany, as well as placed the regulation of the bar
and judiciary under the tight control of the ministries of justice. 2
While the original conception of the rule of law in Germany separated
the role of law from politics, most judges possessed anti-democratic
values and civil rights did not play a prominent role in jurisprudence.
Despite these anti-democratic beginnings, the Weimar Constitution of
1919 created a central judicial body known as the Staatsgerichtshof.
While this body did not resolve constitutional questions or issues
involving basic rights, it did create a precedent for resolving
80. See Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 264.
81. Id. at 251.
82. Id.
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interstate disputes. 3 Between 1918 and 1933, there was a growing
debate between pro and anti-democratic attorneys and scholars
concerning the role of judicial review in a constitutional state. 4 When
the Nazis suspended the Constitution in 1933 and subverted the law
to the instrumental pursuit of political goals with the aid of a
complicit judiciary, it suspended this debate.
During the post-war period, law played a far different role in East
and West Germany. In Western Germany, the Germans restored the
judicial institutions of the Weimar Period as well as the basic codes
with some modifications.8 5 Laws and judicial decisions which
furthered racist or fascist ideals were rescinded and purged and
viewed as "false law" (Unrecht) which was inconsistent with the rule
of law. 6 In addition, a new court for constitutional review, the
Federal Constitutional Court, was created.
In East Germany, the communists added lay judges to the
judicial decision-making process and the party played a strong role in
guiding the administration of justice. The East German professional
judiciary was small in size and litigation played a far less prominent
dispute-resolution role. Many petty offenses and disputes with
government decisions were handled in informal disciplinary
proceedings, workplace committees, or neighborhood "societal
courts.
'8 7
In contrast, Western Germany developed a sizeable bar and a
large judiciary that handled high caseloads in the area of criminal
law, debt collection, civil and labor lawsuits, as well as complaints
against government bureaucracies."" While litigation played an
integral role in regulating West Germany's capitalist economy and
welfare state, in the east the court played a less visible role. Although
some Western commentators have suggested that perhaps the court's
most visible role was to suppress political opposition and punish
individuals who sought to cross the border illegally, the majority of
East German citizens were unaware of these prosecutions. 9 After
83. Alfred Rinkin, The Federal Constitutional Court and the German Political
System, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN COMPARISON: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 55, 58 (Ralph Rogowski & Thomas
Gawron eds., 2002) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS].
84. See Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 252.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 253.
87. Id. at 275.
88. Id. at 278.
89. Id. at 279.
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reunification, West Germany's law and judicial institutions displaced
the East German model and law professors, judges, and prosecutors
had to reapply for their positions. The government only reinstated
about half of those who reapplied.91
For our purposes, there are several distinctive features of
Germany's legal culture that are relevant. These features include:
attitudes towards crime, the prosecution of political extremists, and
the modern role of the Federal Constitutional Court. With regards to
crime, Germany possesses a lower incidence of violent crime than the
United States.92 While evidence suggests that Germany's increased
ethnic and cultural heterogeneity have caused crime rates and fear of
crime to increase, neither the public nor the judiciary have responded
with widespread demands for increasingly punitive sentencing.
9 3
When directly compared to American sentencing, German criminal
sentencing appears to be more profoundly oriented towards
rehabilitation rather than punishment. Perhaps a more accurate
explanation of the differences in the sentencing systems, however, is
that while retribution is a prominent rationale underlying sentencing
in the U.S., in Germany the sentence must fit the "guiltiness" of the
perpetrator.94 According to the German Criminal Code, each sentence
must balance the need to impose a punishment commensurate with
the crime, with the need to orient the perpetrator to be rehabilitated
back into society.
95
90. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 279.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 280.
93. Id.
94. § 46 StGB.
95. GG art. 103. See also § 46 StGB.
Section 46 Principles for Determining Punishment
(1) The guilt of the perpetrator is the foundation for determining
punishment. The effects which the punishment will be expected to
have on the perpetrator's future life in society shall be considered.
(2) In its determination the court shall counterbalance the
circumstances which speak for and against the perpetrator. In doing
so consideration shall be given in particular to:
the motives and aims of the perpetrator;
the state of mind reflected in the act and the willfulness
involved in its commission;
the extent of breach of any duties;
the manner of execution and the culpable consequences of
the act;
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Germany has not hesitated to impose criminal sanctions on
individuals who operate outside the permissible bounds of political
. 96
action. While support for radical groups on the left and right has
never risen to the point where those groups would be entitled to
representation in Germany's national legislative bodies, extremist
groups have threatened the public order through demonstrations and
acts of terrorism. Criminal investigations and prosecutions in the
United States have played roles in containing groups such as the
communist party, anti-war protestors, and the civil rights
movement, 97 in Germany, "criminal prosecution has been given a
permanent task of guarding the borderline of the acceptable political
spectrum."8
During the 1970s, when the Baader-Meinhof group engaged in
criminal activities such as bank robberies, kidnapping, politically
motivated murder, and terrorism, the state's response was not limited
only to criminal sanctions against the perpetrators, but included new
legislation expanding the search and seizure authority of the police,
and limiting the rights of suspects in criminal cases.99 These new
rules extended the grounds for pretrial detention, restricted the
activities of terrorist defendants in pre-trial proceedings, regulated
attorney-client communications, and in some cases, prevented defense
counsel from representing terrorists.'00 The government implemented
these rules as a swift response to the increased domestic security
threat. Defense attorneys play a far different role in Germany's
inquisitorial system of justice, which places the fact-finding burden on
the court. In the Contact Ban Case, the Federal Constitutional Court
the perpetrator's prior history, his personal and financial
circumstances; as well as
his conduct after the act, particularly his efforts to make
restitution for the harm caused as well as the perpetrator's
efforts to achieve mediation with the aggrieved party.
(3) Circumstances which are already statutory elements of the
offense may not be considered.
96. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 292-93.
97. MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR
69-156 (1990).
98. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 293.
99. Id.
100. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 235 (2d ed. 1997).
132 [Vol. 11.1
CIVIL LIBERTIES
held that the provision governing defense attorneys lacked adequate
standards for enforcement.''
A number of abuses that occurred during the application of these
laws drew corrective responses by the higher courts, as well as the
Bundestag.10 2 The government's use of previously private information
had both positive and negative consequences for German residents.
On the positive side, by combining several public and private
databases and crosschecking data, the German federal police were
able to locate terrorists that belonged to the Red Brigades Faction.' 3
However, during this period, the "constitutional protection service"
also conducted widespread surveillance of leftist sympathizers. Both
the government and large companies refused to hire anyone who had
demonstrated any support for the radical leftist opposition.0 4
However, of the 1.5 million applicants for public service jobs between
1972 and 1980, this screening process only barred 1078 individuals
from such a job."' The government eventually terminated these
restrictive measures when it became evident that it was
counterproductive to marginalize leftists who were law-abiding.
10 6
This experience with the government's use of data to monitor the
population led Germany to develop the strictest data protection laws
in the EU. In 1977, the legislature enacted the Federal Data
Protection Law, which was amended in 1994 and 1997, "to protect the
individual against violations of his personal right
(Pers6nlichkeitsrecht) by handling person-related data."10'
A final distinctive character of Germany's legal culture is the role
of the Federal Constitutional Court itself. Although the Federal
Constitutional Court is a coequal branch of the federal government,
its function is not to resolve specific legal disputes, but rather to act
101. BVerfGE 49, 24.
102. See KOMMERS, supra note 100.
103. Faye Bowers and Peter Grier, Why the Pentagon Will Watch Where You Shop,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 3, 2002, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1203/
p01s01-usgn.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
104. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 293.
105. See id. at 293 n.52 (citing SEBASTIAN COBLER, LAW, ORDER, AND POLITICS IN
GERMANY (1976)).
106. Id. at 293.
107. PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2002, AN INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAws AND DEVELOPMENTS 183 (2002), available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/ survey/phr2002/phr2002-part2.pdf.
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as the final arbiter of the Constitution."8 Claims challenging the
constitutionality of a federal or state statute can reach the court in a
variety of ways. Many constitutional claims arrive at the court when
one of Germany's other courts request the court issue a decision on
the constitutionality of a statute relevant to their case.
In relatively rare circumstances, political disputes in the
legislature regarding a statute's constitutionality may come before the
court, when at least one-third of the members of the national
parliament (Bundestag) or any of the federal or state governments
challenge a statute and request that the court intervene to decide the
issue.' °9 Through the German process of abstract judicial review, the
Federal Constitutional Court may review the constitutionality of
legislative acts, decrees, and Federation and state by-laws that are
not case-specific."0 Through this objective process, the Court reviews,
not only the particular claim brought forth in a specific petition, but
all constitutional aspects of a legislative act. In addition, the court
plays an informal, consultative role when the parliament is
considering new legislation. Both of those later functions stand in
stark contrast to American legal norms regarding the role of courts,
given the case and controversies requirement and the role of courts
within the separation of powers scheme. In addition, the Federal
Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for reviewing the
constitutionality of government legislation, has strong ties to the
court.111
Many of the most interesting and controversial issues that the
court considers are the result of citizen complaints filed with the
court. Through the procedure of constitutional complaint, any citizen
may petition the Federal Constitutional Court and allege that their
basic constitutional rights have been violated. Through this
procedure, each citizen has the power to challenge government action
that restricts their basic rights and petition the court to overturn that
public authority."12  As a practical matter, there are several
requirements, such as the requirement that individuals must exhaust
all other remedies before filing a constitutional complaint, which
108. See ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
LEGAL ANALYSIS 325 (1992).
109. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 309.
110. See Rinkin, supra note 83, at 64.
111. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 309.
112. Rinkin, supra note 83, at 68.
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restrict its use."' Nevertheless, the fact that 117,528 constitutional
complaints were filed between 1951 and 1998 shows that citizens view
this channel as an avenue to check government action.
1 1 4
While the closely divided nature of the U.S. Supreme Court along
political fault lines and the increasingly contentious nature of the
selection process have made each new selection to the Court an
important political event in Germany, except in rare cases, the
selection process is less publicly political. The nomination process of
candidates to the Federal Constitutional Court, which mandates that
some candidates be drawn from the federal high courts and others
nominated by the parties represented in parliament, as well as the
importance of professional selection criteria, tends to ensure that
judges' party affiliations do not dominate the court's jurisprudence. 5
Since the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) dominated
the political mainstream and Parliament for decades, many of
Germany's judges are conservative. The fact that the Green Party
(die Gridnen), as the coalition partner of the Social Democratic Party,
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), recently nominated a
candidate to the Federal Constitutional Court is a noteworthy
development. Given the size of the Federal Constitutional Court, this
development is unlikely to drastically affect the court's decision-
making.
A starting point for understanding the role of the Federal
Constitutional Court in relationship to Germany's democratic
institutions is to acknowledge that the Court possesses the power to
exercise control over the legislative, executive, and judiciary to protect
the Constitution.16 At the same time, one must recognize this power
is not unfettered and is limited by German doctrinal concepts which
are similar to the concepts of the political question doctrine and
judicial self-restraint in the United States. Despite those caveats, the
Court's role in protecting the Constitution, as well as the state, has
led to the development of several doctrines that have no comparative
equivalent in American jurisprudence.
One example is the concept of "militant democracy." Through
militant democracy, the Federal Constitutional Court may declare
that a political party which endangers the state or is a threat to the
free democratic basic order, is unconstitutional. Throughout the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 252.
116. Rinkin, supra note 83, at 75.
2003]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Court's fifty plus year history, the Federal Constitutional Court has
banned two parties, the Socialist Reichs Party and the Communist
Party. In order to be considered as a threat to the democratic order,
the Court did not require that the parties pose an actual, imminent
threat to the state. In the case of the Court's action against the
Communist Party, the party need not have undertaken any illegal
action or specific steps against the democratic order to be found
unconstitutional."' The Court issued both of these decisions during
the height of the cold war in the 1950s. Since that time, the Court's
tolerance of extremist political activity has increased."' However, the
rise of a number of extremist groups during the 1990s, that have
directed violence towards foreign residents, led the federal
government and Bundesrat in 1993 to petition the Court to declare
the Free Democratic Workers Party (Freiheitliche Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei) unconstitutional." 9  The Hamburg senate filed a
similar petition against the National List (National Liste), a local neo-
Nazi party. In 1994, the Court denied both of these petitions, ruling
that the parties did not qualify as parties, due to their lack ofj. • .. 120
electoral participation.
The government, with the blessing of the Federal Constitutional
Court, does actively monitor some political parties. In 1999, the
Federal Constitutional Court held that the government could conduct
surveillance on political parties, if the parties pose a threat to the
constitution and the information cannot be obtained by public
means.' 2 1 The 2001 report issued by the Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution stated that the office was currently
monitoring an estimated 33,000 members of right-wing organizations
as well as 32,900 members of left-wing groups.122
In addition to giving the Federal Constitutional Court the power
to ban political parties that threaten the democratic order, the
Federal Administrative Tribunal, one of Germany's specialized courts,
possesses the authority to ban associations that violate the
117. SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 19 (1999).
118. KOMMERS, supra note 100, at 236.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 107, at 185.
122. Number of Foreign Extremists Living in Germany Climbs, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
May 24, 2002, at http://dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_542849_1_A,00.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2003).
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constitutional order."3 In the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman Case, the
Federal Administrative Court dissolved a military sports group that
did not believe that governments should be democratically elected. In
the Court's decision, the Court stated that:
It is not important that the association attempts to realize its anti-
constitutional goals by violent acts or other illegal behaviour. It is
rather essential that the activities of the association are directed
against the constitutional order in a militant aggressive manner,
i.e. that the association continuously intends to undermine this
order. This is why the prerequisites for a prohibition can even be
fulfilled where, at the time of the prohibition, there is no realistic
prospect that the association will achieve its objectives in the
foreseeable future. If the goals and the activities of the association
demonstrate the intent to under- mine the constitutional order of
the Federal Republic of Germany, the point in time at which the
goal will in fact, or according to the imagination of the association,
be achieved is without legal significance.
2 4
In drawing distinctions between the role of the Federal
Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, a key difference is
that there is no equivalent doctrine to the "political question" doctrine
in Germany, which allows the Court to refuse to rule on highly
121political issues. Moreover, while the Basic Law granted the court
the power of judicial review, it has used judicial interpretation to
expand its influence.2 6  In conclusion, in many ways, the Federal
Constitutional Court has broken through the restraints imposed by
the country's civil law tradition and exercised increasing influence on
the political system as well as an increasing tolerance towards "anti-
democratic" groups.
C. United States
At one level, the question of whether or not the Supreme Court
possesses the political power to strike down provisions of the Patriot
Act that infringe upon civil liberties appears easy to answer. After
all, the Supreme Court ordered schools to desegregate, 127 signaled the
123. MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 117, at 20.
124. Id. at 21 (citing BVerfGE 61, 218 (220-22)).
125. Constitutional Litigation as Dispute Processing: Comparing the U.S. Supreme
Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS,
supra note 83, at 6.
126. Id.
127. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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end of the Nixon presidency, 2 8 and decided a presidential election.
129
Yet there are problems with basing that broad conclusion on a
selective sample of cases. In the first two cases, the impact of the
Supreme Court can only be considered in conjunction with the
concurrent actions undertaken by Congress. 13' Additionally, while the
Court may have unilaterally sent George W. Bush to the White
House, the Court held that the decision itself had no precedential
value.
The legal scholar, Stephen Griffin, has argued that "[t]wo
structural features of American constitutionalism prevent the
Supreme Court from being the primary agent of constitutional
change."'31 Although we are specifically discussing the issue of
protecting constitutional values here, his argument is applicable to
the current war-time context. The structural features that Griffin
indicates include the Court's prohibition against issuing advisory
opinions and the concept of judicial restraint, most notably in the area
132 Grfi
of foreign affairs. As Griffin forcefully argues:
The Court has either taken an entirely hands-off approach to
foreign affairs cases, regarding them as presenting "political
questions," or it has usually deferred to presidential authority. The
result is the same-an expansion in the power of the other two
branches results not in the Court adapting the Constitution to the
new reality, but in the Court getting out of the way.133
Thus, in the present context, the Constitution can only act as a
restraint on anti-terrorism legislation and government power to the
extent that the Court elects to give full effect to its provisions.
There are unique features of the current war on terrorism that
will profoundly shape the scope of the judiciary's impact. These key
factors include: 1) the requirement of actual litigation, 2) the
geographic location of the alleged constitutional violation, and
perhaps most importantly, 3) the fact that the country is at war. As
with the German case, America's distinct legal culture has shaped,
not only the role of the courts, but their decision-making as well.
128. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
129. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
130. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
131. Stephen Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2121,
2150 (1996).
132. Id. at 2152.
133. Id. at 2151.
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At the outset, it is worthwhile to note that a distinctive difference
between Germany and the U.S. is that the litigation of constitutional
issues in the U.S. is not confined to the Supreme Court.
Constitutional claims may be litigated in the ordinary course of
litigation. Moreover, because the Supreme Court decides fewer than
three percent of the significant constitutional claims that are litigated
each year before state supreme courts and federal appellate courts, it
is likely that the decisions of those courts will be the last word on the
legal issues concerning the war on terrorism.1
4
The fact that the Bush Administration, with the approval of
Congress,'35 has responded to terrorism militarily and framed the
Patriot Act as a means to fight that war, may profoundly constrain
the judiciary's role. The case of Jose Padilla, the individual suspected
of plotting with terrorists to detonate a "dirty bomb," illustrates the
nature of some of these constraints. Jose Padilla, currently sits in a
Naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The government continues
to detain him, not because he is facing criminal charges for his
conduct or because he is an alien subject to deportation, but rather
because the President has declared him to be an "enemy combatant."
The government maintains that Padilla qualifies as an "enemy
combatant" because he is "'closely associated with al Qaeda,' engaged
in 'hostile and war-like acts' and represents [a] 'continuing, present
and grave danger to the national security of the United States.' ' 3
Although the government originally arrested Padilla on a "material
witness" warrant issued by a federal court, 37 once the President
designated him as an "enemy combatant," the government transferred
him into military custody. 3  As a result of an order issued by
Attorney General John Ashcroft, the military initially prohibited
Padilla from meeting with his counsel. It required an interim federal
court order filed in the course of Padilla's habeas proceedings for
Padilla to gain access to counsel.' 39 By declaring a war on terrorism
134. Robert A. Kagan, Constitutional Litigation in the United States, in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, supra note 83, at 30-32.
135. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
136. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (2002).
137. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144, a federal district court may issue a material
witness warrant at the government's request to enforce a subpoena to secure a
witness's testimony before a grand jury.
138.'Dirty' Bomb Suspect Wins in Court, CBSNEWS.com, Dec. 4, 2002, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/14/attack/main518626.shtml (last visited
Nov. 5, 2003).
139. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
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necessitating a state of emergency, the President, through the
designation of "enemy combatant" status, has unilaterally restricted
legal rights of individuals suspected of participating in the war.
The important contours of fundamental rights of criminal
defendants in America were developed by the Warren Court in the
context of appeals to the Supreme Court of pending criminal
proceedings. The Court had jurisdiction to review cases like Gideon v.
Wainright (1963), granting indigent defendants a right to a court-
appointed attorney, Miranda v. Arizona (1966), requiring the police to
advise suspects of their rights, and Katz v. United States (1967),
applying fourth amendment protections to electronic surveillance,
because the government filed criminal charges against a defendant.
It now appears probable that the majority of individuals detained
during the war on terrorism by the U.S. will spend little time in the
courtroom and possess limited opportunity to challenge their
confinement in court.
14
'
In the war against terrorism, one of the government's most
formidable weapons is likely to be the constitutional requirement of
case or controversy. 141 One facet of this requirement is the concept of
standing. In order to challenge the conditions of one's confinement in
federal court, a petitioner must be the proper party to bring suit.
Given that access to many individuals detained by the government
has been limited, the government has strongly circumscribed the
ability of detainees to challenge their confinement using the judicial
system. While the law permits a "next friend" to file a petition on an
individual's behalf when the detainee lacks access to a court, federal
law specifies that only individuals who have a significant relationship
to the petitioner and are dedicated to their best interest may file an
action on their behalf.1
2
In the handful of cases regarding detention litigated so far, the
issue of standing has barred most claims from judicial relief. The one
exception to date is Padilla v. Bush, where Padilla's attorney, Donna
Newman, filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of
Padilla's detention,4 3 despite the fact that she had not had the
opportunity to meet with her client since May 2002. Although a
140. See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
see also Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241- 2242 (West Supp. 2003).
143. Filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §2241.
144. See generally Padilla, 233 F.Supp. 2d 564 (2002).
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federal district court ruled that Newman had standing to file a
petition as "next friend" because she had met with Padilla prior to his
transfer to military detention,14' the government is likely to appeal
the court's ruling.146  In a separate case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a
different federal court held that, where a federal defender that had no
preexisting relationship with an enemy combatant, the attorney could
not file a petition on his behalf.147 However, the detainee's father
subsequently filed a "next friend" petition on his son's behalf.148
As a result of the requirement that a litigant must have an
ongoing case or controversy to obtain judicial relief, many of the
government's violations of constitutional rights may not be subject to
judicial review. A significant reason why there has been an increase
in the amount of constitutional litigation in the United States in
recent decades, is that a large number of public advocacy groups, such
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
and the American Civil Liberties Union, have used litigation to raise
constitutional issues on behalf of individuals who typically lack the
knowledge, human resources, and financial means to succeed at the
appellate court level. 49 Because of the issue of standing and the
requirement of a case or controversy, to use litigation to challenge the
constitutionality of government action, these groups must file a legal
claim on behalf of a specific petitioner or group of petitioners.
Without access to individuals who may have constitutional claims,
these groups lack the standing to assert claims on a petitioner's
behalf. For example, when a group of clergy, lawyers, and professors
filed a petition on behalf of the combatants currently being held in
Cuba, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of
determining standing, the group was not being held incommunicado
and the petitioners lacked standing to file a petition on their behalf.
150
A second distinctive feature of the war on terrorism, that will
affect the ability of courts to protect individual rights, is the fact that
the constitutional requirement of jurisdiction may preclude access to
American courts because the U.S. is detaining foreign nationals
outside the U.S. The fact that the Bush Administration has elected to
detain foreign nationals at a naval base located at Guantanamo Bay,
145. Id. at 569.
146. 'Dirty' Bomb Suspect Wins in Court, supra note 138.
147. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
148. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2002).
149. See Kagan, supra note 134, at 31-33.
150. Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (2002).
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Cuba, may bar those individuals from obtaining judicial relief in U.S.
courts. When family members of Kuwaiti nationals filed a suit on
behalf of twelve detainees alleging violations of numerous
constitutional provisions, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, as well as customary international law, a federal
district court judge dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 15' The
petitioners alleged that the individuals were allegedly in Pakistan
and Afghanistan as volunteers in charitable programs to provide
humanitarian aid and had been seized by Afghan villages seeking to
collect a bounty offered by the U.S. 52 The court held that challenges
to custody could only be brought through a petition for writ of habeas
corpus and, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v.
Eisentrager,153 the court lacked jurisdiction because the naval base lay
outside the sovereign territory of the United States. 54 Since Johnson
dealt with a number of Germans who challenged their confinement by
the U.S. military in China, a strong argument can be made that it
does not apply tothe current situation. Unlike Johnson, where the
Chinese government controlled the territory, Cuba does not exercise
sovereign control over Guantanamo. The case may more closely
parallel the facts of the 1946 case Application of Yamashita,'55 where
the Supreme Court ruled on the claim of a Japanese general tried by
the U.S. military in the Philippines, and implicitly established that an
enemy alien in a foreign territory under American control is protected
by the Constitution.156
It is conceivable, moreover, that large numbers of constitutional
violations may occur that citizens will never know about. At the
present moment, the Department of Justice's key interest is in
preventing further acts of terrorism rather than in prosecuting
individuals who have violated the criminal law. Given the
devastation caused by the attack on the World Trade Center and the
potential for future devastation, there are strong reasons supporting
151. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (2002).
152. Id. at 61.
153. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
154. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
155. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
156. Anupam Chander, Guantanamo and the Rule of Law: Why We Should Not Use
Guantanarno Bay To Avoid the Constitution, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, March 7,
2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020307_chander.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2003).
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the government's strategy to get as much information as possible from
individuals involved in terrorist networks. If the government never
intends to file criminal charges against detainees, there is a far
smaller chance that those individuals will be accorded many of the
protections typically accorded to individuals in custody. For example,
if it is likely that the case will never go to court, the government has
virtually a free hand to use whatever interrogation tactics it finds
effective, as the Miranda decision and its progeny cannot be invoked
outside the context of a pending criminal case. Steven Clymer points
out that the majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue
of whether police who fail to issue Miranda warnings violate the
Constitution have ruled that there is no violation unless the suspect's
statements are used in a criminal case.5 7 These are rules governing
the admissibility of evidence rather than constitutional restraints on
police conduct.
15 8
The war on terrorism has likewise affected what evidence may be
admitted during a terrorism trial. The bulk of case law in the United
States concerning the admission and exclusion of evidence does not
pertain to wartime conditions. In the case of evidence obtained
during actual combat, traditional exclusionary rule doctrines which
mandate such protections as Miranda warnings may be difficult to
apply to the battlefield. As a result, law enforcement's search and
seizure tactics may no longer be tightly constrained by the
exclusionary rule doctrine, which prohibits the prosecution from
introducing illegally obtained evidence at trial. There is some
evidence which suggests that the government offered John Walker
Lindh, the American captured fighting with the Taliban, a plea rather
than take him to trial."9 During pre-trial hearings in the case, Lindh's
attorney argued that the government had not advised Lindh of his
rights as required under Miranda. In addition, after the plea,
commentators speculated that the government did not want an
appellate court to review whether or not some of Lindh's statements
should have been suppressed because of the government's
interrogation tactics. Given that the Constitution requires that there
be an actual case or controversy, absent a pending criminal case in
which the government seeks to criminally punish a detained
157. Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 Yale L.J. 447, 452
(Dec. 2002) (citing Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109
(1998)).
158. See Clymer, supra note 157, at 451.
159. Lindh's Bargain, THE SALT LAKE CITY TRIBUNE, July 18, 2002, at A16.
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individual, the government's interrogation or investigation tactics
may not be subject to the level of judicial review accorded appellate
cases. While courts in the Hamdi and Padilla cases have ruled that
their detention is subject to judicial review, because of the invocation
of the "enemy combatant" status, the scope of that review has been
extremely limited.
The complexity inherent in balancing the nation's security
interests with defendant's rights is best illustrated by the case of
Zacarias Moussaoui, an American citizen charged with conspiracy in
connection with the September 11th attacks.6 Although Moussaoui
admits that he belongs to al Qaeda, he has denied participating in the
September 11th attacks. In preparing his own defense, Moussaoui
has sought access to a fellow member of al Qaeda currently in U.S.
custody as well as a number of classified documents, claiming that
discovery will establish his innocence. The government has
vigorously opposed both of the defendant's requests, citing national
security interests. The district court denied the defendant access to
classified material on the ground that disclosure would jeopardize
national security because the defendant is an al Qaeda member,' 6' the
court further ruled that Moussaoui could depose the enemy
combatant witness. In reaching its decision to permit Moussaoui to
depose the witness, the court applied the procedures set forth in the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),'63 and determined that
the witness' testimony was relevant and material to the defense.'6
160. The superseding indictment filed in the case charges Moussaoui with the
following crimes: Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism Transcending National
Boundaries (18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(a)(2) & (c) (2003)), Conspiracy to Commit Aircraft
Piracy (49 U.S.C. §§ 46502(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(B) (2003)), Conspiracy to Destroy
Aircraft (18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(7) & 34 (2003)), Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass
Destruction (18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2003), Conspiracy to Murder United States
Employees (18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1117 (2003)), and Conspiracy to Destroy Property
(18 U.S.C. §§ 844 (fM, (i), & (n) (2003)). Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Moussaoui, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/
usmouss602supind.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
161. This issue is complicated by the fact that the defendant has elected to represent
himself. See Order, United States v. Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/moussaoui'usmouss92602dcsopn.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2003).
162. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. Moussaoui (No. 03-4162),
available at http://news. findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss62603opn.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
163.18 U.S.C.A. App. 3 §§ 1-16 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
164. No. 03-4162, supra note 162, at 6.
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Moreover, the court concluded that the defendant's and the public's
interest in a fair trial outweighed the government's national security
interest.165 This issue has sparked a contentious debate in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which held in a 7-5 decision, that it did not
have jurisdiction to review this discovery issue at this point in the
proceedings.166  It remains to be seen how American courts will
reconcile the inherent tension between balancing national security
and the interest in a fair trial.
The American judiciary has played a prominent role in enlarging
the legal protections accorded to individuals during the past fifty
years. Nevertheless, several distinctive features of American
constitutional jurisprudence, most notably the fact that Congress has
granted the President broad latitude to pursue a war on terrorism,
will likely constrain courts to protect constitutional liberties only in
the context of egregious governmental overstepping. In sharp
contrast, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court may play an active
role in determining whether Germany's anti-terrorism legislation
threatens basic rights because Germany has not declared a similar
national emergency. While all three branches of government in the
United States share a responsibility for protecting the Constitution,
the Federal Constitutional Court occupies a unique position in
Germany as the protector of the Constitution. Thus, while the U.S.
Supreme Court may be reluctant to challenge both the executive and
legislative branches in the current context, the Federal Constitutional
Court may not share that same reluctance. Moreover, the fact that
the Federal Constitutional Court has been playing an increasingly
integral role in extending the boundaries of rights, the German
conception of militant democracy may affect how the Court balances
threats to national security with civil liberties.
165. Id.
166. Id. While interlocutory appeals of discovery orders are generally not permitted in
federal court, CIPA § 7 defines a narrow range of circumstances, which serve as
exceptions to this general rule. The dissent argued that this case fell within that
range of circumstances and stated that the appellate court's failure to review the
discovery order would jeopardize national security and embolden terrorists. July 14,
2003 Order, United States v. Moussaoui at 3 (No. 03-4162), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss7l403ord4th.pdf (last visited
Nov. 29, 2003). In response, the majority responded that "such speculation can only
serve to needlessly alarm the public and appears, regrettably, to be an attempt to
divert attention from the legal principles that control our decision." Id. at 5.
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IV. FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Although both the Federal Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court adjudicate claims concerning basic constitutional
rights, the fact that both courts were born during distinctively
different historical periods strongly influenced the birth and
subsequent evolution of those rights. 16' From its inception during the
creation of a new federal democratic state after World War II, the
Federal Constitutional Court's mission has been oriented towards the
protection of fundamental human rights. Moreover, the
acknowledgement of fundamental human rights and the state's role in
guaranteeing those rights stand at the forefront of the basic text. In
contrast, at the time of the Constitution's ratification in 1790, the
American court's fundamental concerns were to preserve the Union
and protect property rights.1 6  Although the nation's first Congress
passed amendments to the Constitution that became the "Bill of
Rights," it took a century for the Court to breathe life into those rights
and even longer for Congress to enact the fourteenth amendment
upon which much of the nation's constitutional jurisprudence is now
based. While it is easy to draw historically derived distinctions
between these two courts, it is much more difficult to accurately
identify how differences in the articulation of specific rights may play
out as both countries respond to terrorism. It is to that task that this
paper now turns.
A. Germany and the Basic Law
Germany's Constitution or Basic Law, Grundgesetz, binds the
state to protect the basic rights of its citizens. The Basic Law's Article
1(3) states, "[t]he following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary as directly enforceable law."6 " During its
over fifty year history, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court has
broadly affirmed and formatively shaped the constitutional rights
expressed in the Basic Law. 170 The concept that the court is the
ultimate arbiter of the fundamental values of a state, as expressed in
167. See, e.g., Hans J. Lietzmann, Constitutional Courts in Changing Political
Systems, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, supra note 83, at 91 (arguing "the fact that the
constitutional court was established in the United States in the eighteenth century
and in the Federal Republic of Germany in the twentieth renders any comparison
implausible").
168. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 5, 17 (3d ed. 2000).
169. Rinkin, supra note 83, at 61.
170. Id. at 56.
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its Constitution, was only embraced in Germany with the passage of
the Federal Constitutional Court Act in 1951.
In considering the role that the Court will play in preserving the
basic rights of its citizens during the war on terrorism, the relative
newness of the Court, its position in the government, and its
jurisprudence, stand in stark contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The principles that the Constitution reflects the supreme law of a
democratic state and the highest court in the land has the power to
interpret the Constitution, has been accepted in the United States
since the Supreme Court's 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison."'
Despite the Federal Constitutional Court's short history, part of the
reason that the Court has gained political legitimacy and assumed an
important role in the German state is the fact that the Constitution
awarded the Court the role of ensuring that each branch of
government abides by the Constitution. In contrast to the
democratically shaped, doctrinal expansion of rights that the U.S.
Supreme Court has pursued since the 1930s, the German Federal
Constitutional Court has interpreted fundamental rights through a
legalistic prism that casts basic rights as part of a stable normative
structure.
17 2
While it is a goal of the Court to interpret basic rights to have a
broad effect, the Basic Law itself states that individual rights must be
tempered by the state's right to protect life in the community.13 At
the heart of the Basic Law and Germany's constitutional
jurisprudence lies the concept of human dignity. In fact, the Basic
Law's first article states that: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable.
To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.',
174
Some commentators have suggested that, while the American
Constitution is a constitution of liberty, the focal point of the German
Constitution is human dignity." 5 While this characterization may be
171. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
172. Christian Starck, Constitutional Interpretation, in STUDIES IN GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (Christian Starck ed.,
1995).
173. Id. at 60.
174. Helmut Goerlich, Fundamental Constitutional Rights: Content, Meaning and
General Doctrines, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF
THE BASIC LAW 45, 46 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).
175. EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY
AND THE UNITED STATES 7 (2002).
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overly simplistic given that human dignity has played a role in some
of the Supreme Court's most important cases such as Miranda v.
Arizona, the comparison serves as a useful analytical starting point.
The Basic Law includes fundamental human rights such as
religious liberty, equality, freedom of speech and association, the right
to petition the government, as well as the right to property.'16 While
the Basic Law protects free speech, especially when it involves
political speech, the rights to speech and press cannot be interpreted
independently of the Federal Constitutional Court's systematic
framework of rights, which places the concept of human dignity at its
apex.17  Freedoms similar to the right to privacy and protection
against search and seizure are cast in the Basic Law as a series of
protections including: protection against interference with the mails,
protection from interference with the right of the secrecy of
telecommunication and protection against the interference with the
right of inviolability of the home.'78
As a point of comparison, it is important to note that, while the
American Constitution enumerates individual liberties that the
government cannot infringe upon, the Basic Law defines individual
freedom within the context of the social community and that rights
carry attendant responsibilities. 79  Within the German legal
framework of rights, rights such as privacy, control over personal
information, and the right to control the presentation of oneself in
society, define a protected inner sphere of individual privacy that is a
critical component of human dignity. At the foundation of German
constitutional theory lies the concept that the state is obligated to
secure a stable, democratic society that honors human dignity.180
Despite the fact that Germany is a civil law system, in some
areas of the law, and the scope of privacy in particular, the Federal
Constitutional Court has enlarged the definition of several key basic
rights. In response to advances in computer technology, the Federal
Constitutional Court created a doctrine of informational self-
determination using Articles 1(1) and 1(2) of the Basic Law, which
protect personal freedom. This doctrinal evolution commenced during
the 1980s when the government attempted to gather comprehensive
statistical information on German residents such as information on
176. See Goerlich, supra note 174, at 47 (citing GG arts. 3, 4, 5, 9, 13, 14 & 17).
177. See KOMMERS, supra note 100, at 441.
178. GG arts. 10, 13.
179. EBERLE, supra note 175, at 8.
180. Id. at 19.
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the source of their personal income, education, transportation uses,
and utility costs, in addition to basic demographic information.
Citizens challenged the intrusion as a violation of one's personal
autonomy. In the Census Case (1983), the Court articulated a right of
informational self-determination, which it defined as "the authority of
the individual to decide fundamentally for herself, when and within
what limits personal data may be disclosed." 1' This right is not
without restrictions, as the Court balances the public interest with
individual rights. The Federal Constitutional Court determined the
government must have an "overriding public interest" to intrude upon
the right to informational self-determination,1 2  In this case, the
Court determined the government's desire to gather the information
to enhance planning, environmental protection, and redistricting did
not justify the intrusion on individual freedom.'8 3
A desire to avoid the period of political instability that facilitated
the rise of the Nazi Party to power runs through the Basic Law. The
purpose of several of the Basic Law's provisions is to prevent anti-
democratic forces from undermining the constitutional order.8 4  To
this end, although the protections afforded by human rights are
guaranteed to individuals, the Basic Law grants additional rights,
such as the freedom of assembly and free movement, as well as
freedom of profession, only to German citizens.
While the German constitutional framework protects individual
freedom, a key objective of those freedoms is, not only to respect
individuality, but also to assign free individuals a prominent role in
the constitutional order of a stable democratic society. The German
vision of society is not one in which individuals operate as
autonomous actors striving to achieve their own individualistic goals,
but one in which individuals possess reciprocal obligations to others
and society.' To achieve this balance, the legislature may limit
individual freedoms to advance the freedom of other individuals or to
promote community rights.""8 In weighing basic rights and statutory
obligations, the Court subjects new regulations to a proportionality
test under which the intrusion must be proportionate to the
legislation's desired goal. In evaluating whether Germany's anti-
181. Id.at 90 (citing BVerfGE 65, 42).
182. EBERLE, supra note 175, at 91.
183. Id.
184. MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 117, at 18.
185. EBERLE, supra note 175, at 44.
186. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 8.
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terrorism legislation disproportionately infringes on constitutional
rights, the focus of the analysis must be not simply on whether or not
the legislation curbs individual freedoms, but rather whether it
redefines human dignity and alters the autonomous role of the
individual within a democratic society. Despite this deadlock, it is
interesting to note that while the U.S. has sharply restricted
immigration in the aftermath of September 11th, there is substantial
political support within Germany to liberalize the nation's
immigration policy.
B. United States
Three characteristics of American legal and political tradition
contrast starkly with the German framework. First, while German
jurisprudence seeks to balance individual rights with community
responsibility, American constitutional jurisprudence often seeks to
protect the individual from governmental intrusion in a private
sphere. The right to privacy is defined most often in terms of an
individual's right to make decisions in areas such as abortion,
procreation, and marriage. In search and seizure law, there is an
expectation of privacy in one's home, which the government must
demonstrate probable cause to broach. This language of rights
permeates the political sphere. One of the nation's most powerful
interest groups, the National Rifle Association, seeks to protect the
"right to bear arms." Moreover, it is a widely held belief that, by
pursuing individual rights, the community's welfare will improve.18
7
More often than not, rights are emphasized over obligations.
188
A second distinctive characteristic of America's domestic legal
tradition is that courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have
exercised considerable leeway in interpreting the original
constitutional text. In part this reflects the country's common law
tradition as well as the fact that the Constitution is an older, more
ambiguous text, than the Basic Law. Moreover, changes in American
values impact interpretation of the Constitutional text. At a
fundamental level, increased judicial activism, which began in the
1930s, reflects the growth and activism of the government itself and
the need to protect congressional policymaking, encourage
administrative agencies' discretion, and protect citizens from the
187. Herbert Jacob, Courts and Politics in the United States, in COURTS LAW &
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16, 28 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
188. Id.
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enlargement of government power.8 9 Against the Court's recent
history of judicial activism, lies the ongoing debate among American
legal scholars about the Court's "countermajoritarian problem."
While this issue is too large to fully consider here, for our purposes it
is helpful to note that, when judicial activism appears to thwart
political preferences, critics invariably question how a political
democracy can justify the exercise of judicial review by unelected and
largely unaccountable judges.'90 While this debate was largely fueled
by the activism of the Warren Court, it certainly recaptured
momentum after Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and it may
buttress the doctrine of judicial restraint in light of the Court's
traditional deference to the executive during times of war.
Finally, American constitutional jurisprudence does not possess
an overriding aim parallel to its German counterpart's vision of
vindicating human dignity.' 91 There is no constitutional blueprint for
the pursuit of happiness in America. It is an individual pursuit
rather than a path that the government helps pave.
With specific reference to the response to terrorism, doctrinal
differences in two areas may affect whether claims are actionable.
The fact that American jurisprudence has not developed a doctrine
comparable to the German concept of interiority (the right to be left
alone), may make it more difficult to challenge the government's
proposed widespread use of private information for investigative
purposes. The development of a right to informational self-
determination may ultimately provide Germans with greater
protection against the abuse of data by the government.
Conversely, for better or worse, Americans are likely to enjoy
greater freedom to speak out about links between ethnic differences
and terrorism because the Supreme Court has elevated free speech to
' 92
a heightened level of protection. While free speech protects the
right to speak out against the government, it protects hate speech as
well. In contrast, free speech is tempered by human dignity in
189. Joel B. Grossman & Charles R. Epp, Agenda Formation on the Policy Active U.S.
Supreme Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, supra note 83, at 104 (Patrick Vollmer
trans., 2002).
190. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part V, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
191. EBERLE, supra note 175, at 257.
192. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting offensive speech); see
also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (protecting hate speech); see also Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (requiring actual malice to establish
defamation against a public figure).
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Germany, which seeks to protect reputation, honor, and personality.
9 3
In Germany, denigrating speech over race, ethnicity, gender, or
physical appearance is outlawed. While the metaphor of a
"marketplace of ideas" and confidence in John Stuart Mill's thesis that
ultimately the truth will prevail sharply drives America's First
Amendment jurisprudence, Germany's conditional protection of
speech reflects the country's strong desire to distance itself from the
totalitarian excesses of the Nazi era.
Despite these differences, freedoms often depend on activist
Courts for protection from majoritarian impulses in both countries.
195
Both possess a rich legacy of constitutional rights that their
respective courts have protected during the last half-century. The
next section explores potential conflicts between constitutional rights
and anti-terrorism legislation in both countries.
V. THE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM LIMIT FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
The vast majority of individuals residing in the United States and
Germany may not notice that their civil liberties have been altered by
their country's response to terrorism. Those changes that have been
noticed, for example the appearance of federal employees as airport
security personnel in airports, have been accepted as welcome
security improvements. In addition, few Americans may be disturbed
by the fact that an individual who attempted to detonate a "dirty
bomb" on an airline is being held as an "enemy combatant" in a Navy
brig in South Carolina. Yet, the history of government action during
times of national crisis in both countries has taught us that the
government has often used secret investigations and illegal tactics,
not just to target legitimate national security threats, but also to
monitor and disrupt groups for ideological reasons. As the law
enforcement agencies raise the intensity of their intelligence
gathering activities and subject hundreds of individuals to detention,
the probability increases that government action will compromise
liberties. This section of the paper identifies the tension created by
the anti-terrorism legislation and examines the impact of these
legislative changes on fundamental freedoms.
193. EBERLE, supra note 175, at 263.
194. Id., at 226 (citing StGB arts. 130-31).
195. Id., at 252.
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A. Germany
1. Restrictions on Fundamental Rights and Individual
Autonomy
a. The Internal Sphere
Germany's recent anti-terrorism legislation redefines the
boundaries of state action vis-A-vis human liberty in Germany. This
change recasts the scope of protection previously awarded to the
individual's inner sphere. Key provisions of German legislation that
challenge the traditional balance between individual autonomy and
the state's interests include legislation that empowers the
government to add biometric data to identification cards, gather voice
recordings of individuals seeking asylum, and to conduct more
extensive security checks of individuals employed in positions that are
important to national security.
The expanded data collection powers granted to federal police and
intelligence agencies in the second anti-terrorism package pose a
threat to an individual's freedom of action,19 the rights to privacy of
posts and communications,'197 and the right to self-regulation of
information.'" The legislation significantly enhanced the authority of
the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the
Federal Intelligence Service to gather data on individuals. Those
agencies are now empowered with the authority to request
information from financial institutions, the post office,
telecommunications enterprises, and airline companies about
financial accounts, money flows, and customer information. There is
no provision to notify the customer of the information request.
196. GG art. 2(1) (stating, "[e]very person shall have the right to free development of
his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral law").
197. GG art. 10, which states,
(1) The privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications
shall be inviolable.
(2) Restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law. If the
restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the
existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may
provide that the person affected shall not be informed of the
restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a
review of the case by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by
the legislature.
198. GG art. 2 (1). See also LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 11.
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Although citizens have filed legal challenges to the government's use
of computerized searches based on profiles using religious affiliations,
courts in Berlin and Frankfurt have denied those challenges. 99 There
is convincing evidence, however, that the German people are less
eager than their government to enhance the government's data
collection ability. The German police asked companies to dump their
databases into the government's database to enable the government
to compare transactions with a basic profile of the hijackers.
However, because of widespread privacy concerns, only 212 of 4,000
companies complied. °
These statutes appear to run counter to the enhanced protections
developed by the Court during the past thirty years, by extending the
government's reach into an individual's private sphere, gaining
increased access to private information. While most of Germany's
basic rights cannot be restricted, some rights are always subject to
restriction under the doctrine of proportionality.201 In announcing the
right of informational self-determination in the 1983 Census Case, the
Federal Constitutional Court stated that it was limited by the
"predominant public interest.2 0 2 Many of Germany's anti-terrorism
measures will automatically expire in five years. Given that these
measures circumscribe basic privacy rights, it is essential that the
legislature not extend these measures unless the government can
demonstrate: (1) that terrorists continue to pose a threat within
Germany, (2) the government's enhanced data gathering capability
has enabled the government to effectively combat that threat, and (3)
the government has not used its enhanced capability for political
purposes.
While it is too early to evaluate the second and third prongs of
this proposed test, there is ample evidence that terrorists currently
pose a threat within Germany. In 2000 and 2001, German police
arrested a number of Algerian men that were part of an al Qaeda cell
and charged them with planning a bomb attack on the Christmas
Market in Strasbourg.2"3 Also, there is some evidence to suggest the
199. PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 107, at 190.
200. Bowers, supra note 103, at 3.
201. See, e.g. ,GG art. 5(3).
202. PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 107, at 182.
203. Germany's Terrorism Test, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Apr. 16, 2002, at http:/www.dw-
world.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_4991091 A,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
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attack on at least ten German tourists in Tunisia in early 2002 was
planned by al Qaeda operatives in Germany.204
b. Freedom of Association
In addition to affecting the scope of privacy in the internal
sphere, the legislative measures will impact the relationship between
the state and some religious organizations. Germany's anti-terrorism
measures stripped away special protections given to religious and
ideological organizations and strengthened the state's ability to ban
groups that foster intolerance and promote terrorism.205 These
measures reworks the balance between state security concerns and
the freedom of individuals to participate in particular religious
organizations. These measures allow the government to use the law
on private associations to ban groups that include: (1) fundamentalist
Islamic organizations that refuse to reject violence as a means to
further their beliefs, (2) organizations that claim a religious status
that pursue profit-making or political objectives, and (3) religious
sects that commit murder or participate in mass suicides.2 6
These restrictions potentially implicate the rights included in
Article 4 (2) of the Basic Law, which guarantees freedom of faith.20 7
To the extent that individuals are precluded from joining particular
Islamic religious groups because those associations have been banned,
this new legislation redefines the relationship of the state to certain
religious groups that challenge state security. The relationship
between church and state articulated in Article 136f of the Weimar
Constitution acknowledges that "[tihe authorities shall not have the
right to inquire into a person's membership of a religious body except
to the extent that rights or duties depend thereon.
20 8
These restrictions not only represent a response to September
11th, but to the increase in the number of foreign extremists living in
Germany as well. The Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution (BfV) estimated that the number of extremists residing
204. See id.
205. 'Second Anti-Terrorism Package'Approved, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, Jan. 7, 2002,
available at http:l/eng.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/Artikellix_59819.htm?
template=single&id=59819_9143&ixepf=_59819_9143& (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
206. German Government Provides 3Billion Marks to Strengthen Security, DIE
BUNDESREGIERUNG, Oct. 15, 2001, available at http://eng.bundesregierung.de
dokumente/Artikel/ix_59819_9143.htm? (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
207. GG art. 4(1) (stating, "[fireedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to
profess a religious or philosophical creed shall be inviolable").
208. GG art. 136.
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in Germany in 2001 had climbed to 59,100 individuals. 9 For the past
several decades, Germany possessed a liberal asylum policy that
permitted many individuals with foreign terrorist ties to enter the
country. Since Germany's criminal law provisions relating to
terrorism only referred to domestic terrorism, German agencies
engaged in foreign intelligence and domestic police services did not
share information about individuals living in Germany with ties to
foreign terrorist groups. 2'0 As a result, Germany now faces the
predicament of trying to develop effective tools to determine whether
groups already within German borders pose a threat to the state. In
December 2001, the government used the new legislation to ban the
Union of Islamic Associations and Communities, which was led by
Metin Kaplan, an individual who had recently been convicted of
incitement of murder.211  The group consisted of a network of
fundamentalist Muslims who live in Germany and advocate the
violent overthrow of the Turkish government.21 2 More recently, in
January 2003, the German government banned the group, the Party
of Liberation, which it accused of spreading violent anti-Semitic and
anti-American propaganda after a two-month investigation.' While
it is clear that the group's communications were intended to provoke
violence, the issue of whether or not the government possessed
evidence that the group actively engaged in violence within Germany
is far from certain. The German government appears intent on
striking at the roots of terrorism in Germany by attempting to
dismantle Islamic fundamentalist organizations that promote
violence.
Germany's Basic Law guarantees the freedom of speech, as well
as the right to form associations, under the theory that a person is not
an isolated individual, but rather a member of a community "who
depends for his development on multiple interpersonal relations."
2 14
The widening scope of §§ 129, 129a, and 129b StGB triggered an
active debate in Germany about where the law should draw the line
209. Number of Foreign Extremists Living in Germany Climbs, supra note 122.
210. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17.
211. Number of Foreign Extremists Living in Germany Climbs, supra note 122.
212. Germany Bans Radical Islamic Group, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Dec. 19, 2001, at
http://dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_351858_1-A,00.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2003).
213. Net Around German Islamic Fundamentalists Gets Tighter, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
Jan. 17, 2003, at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430-A-757372_1_A,00.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
214. See MIcHALowSKi & WooDs , supra note 117, at 277-78 (citing BVerfGE 50, 290).
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between objectionable opinion that is protected by the basic rights and
expressing an opinion that qualifies as recruiting support for a
criminal cause. The new changes attempted to more clearly delineate
the line between protected speech and speech that constitutes
criminal recruitment. Thus, lobbying for sympathy for groups is no
longer punishable under the law, while targeted advertising and
lobbying for members and supporters is a criminal offense.21
Speaking before the Bundestag on April 26, 2002 on the revision of
§§129, 129a, and 129b StGB, Justice Minister Herta DAubler-Gmelin
stated:
Experience accumulated over the past several decades has shown
us that courts have sometimes had trouble deciding whether or not
a statement crosses the borderline between the expression of an
objectionable opinion but one nonetheless protected by basic rights
and the expression of an opinion that is tantamount to recruitment
for a criminal cause. We do not want to increase these difficulties
216in connection with the inclusion of foreign organizations.
Despite the fact that the definition of prohibited speech has been
tightened, there is concern within Germany that the government will
prosecute members of freedom groups that are fighting autocratic
regimes as terrorists. The new legislation attempts to avoid that
possibility by requiring that the Federal Justice Ministry approve all
prosecutions under this law.217  The new provision, §129b StGB,
differentiates the scope of the government's response according to
whether or not the terrorist organization is European or not. The
state may prosecute a European terrorist organization, whether or not
Germans are involved in the organization.218 In contrast, the state
may only pursue criminal prosecution against non-European terrorist
organizations and their members, if a provision of the German
criminal law applies to the activity,'19 if a German is one of the
perpetrators, if a German is one of the victims of a terrorist act, or if
the member of the organization is apprehended in Germany.
220
215. New Weapon in Germany's Fight against Terror, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Apr. 26,
2002, at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_507392-lA,00.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2003).
216. New Law Designed to Step Up Fight Against International Terrorism, supra note
22.
217. New Weapon in Germany's Fight against Terror, supra note 215.
218. § 129a(1) StGB.
219. §§ 3-5 StGB.
220. §129b(1) StGB.
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Perhaps the most important restriction is that the government
can only prosecute foreign terrorist organizations for criminal
activities within Germany, when German citizens engage in criminal
activity, or when the victims of the attacks are Germans."' With
these last three categories of cases, the Federal Justice Ministry must
approve the prosecution before it can proceed.
2. The Structure of Government
In both the United States and Germany, federalism, as well as
the separation of powers, serve as structural safeguards, which seek
to preserve democracy by spreading power among different levels of
government, as well as between different branches of government. A
key difference between the two countries is that the Lander are
largely responsible for implementing federal law.222 According to the
Basic Law, the federal government's exclusive power to legislate
exists in areas such as foreign affairs, defense, citizenship, freedom of
movement, currency matters, customs and postal and
telecommunications services.222  While the primary authority for
criminal prosecution and police powers rests with the Lander, the
federal government may enact legislation regarding the cooperation
between the federal government and the Lander in matters related to
the criminal police and protecting the free democratic order and the
constitution. In a number of areas such as civil law, criminal law
and the execution of sentences, as well as the organization of the
courts, the federal government has concurrent legislative authority
with the Lander, which it may exercise if it satisfies certain
221. New Weapon in Germany's Fight against Terror, supra note 215.
222. See LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 9.
223. GG art. 73 §§ 1-11.
224. GG art. 73(10).
The Federation shall have exclusive power to legislate with respect
to... cooperation of the Federation and the Lander concerning
(a) criminal police work,
(b) protection of the free democratic basic order, existence,
and security of the Federation or of a Land (protection of the
constitution) and
(c) protection against activities within the federal territory
which, by the use of force or preparations for the use of force,
endanger the external interests of the Federal Republic of
Germany,
as well as the establishment of a Federal Criminal Police
Office and the international action to combat crime ....
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prerequisites. 2' As a practical matter, the federal government
continues to expand the number of areas in which it has enacted
legislation overruling Lander legislation. As a result, while the
Lander remain responsible for administration and enforcement, the
range of their lawmaking authority has narrowed.
Reflecting a desire to prevent the excesses perpetrated by the
federal police during the Nazi era, the constitution prohibits the
creation of an "imperial security authority. 2 26 According to Article 87
of the Basic Law, the role of the federal criminal police is restricted to
"the compilation of data for purposes of protection of the constitution
and of protection against activities within the federal territory which,
through the use of force or acts preparatory to the use of force,
endanger the external interests of the Federal Republic of
Germany."  In essence, the Basic Law only grants the federal
authorities the power to create a central office for police coordination,
not a separate police force. Critically, a key purpose for separating
criminal prosecution and the intelligence services was to prevent
228federal authorities from holding any police powers.
Despite the intent of the framers of the Basic Law to limit the
range of competence of the federal investigative authorities, the
recent anti-terrorism measures extend the power of those authorities.
As a result of this legislation, the Federal Agency Entrusted with
Protection of the Constitution (BV), now possesses the authority to
monitor attempts to disrupt the peace. The B/V, whose
responsibilities had previously been restricted to the domestic arena,
has now become an independent investigative authority with no limits
• , .• 229
on the geographic scope of its investigations. This enlargement
threatens to compromise the distinction and separation between
preventative investigation and the pursuit of criminal prosecutions.3 0
3. Judicial Review and Anti-Terrorism Legislation
Any individual who has been injured by government action in
Germany has the right under Germany's Basic Law to access the
judicial system. In Article 19(4), the Basic Law declares that,
225. GG art. 74 (Concurrent legislation, catalogue); GG art. 72 (Concurrent
legislation of the Federation, definition).
226. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 10.
227. GG art. 87(1).
228. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 10.
229. Id. at 13.
230. Id.
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"[s]hould any person's rights be violated by public authority, he may
have recourse to the courts. If no other jurisdiction has been
established, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts."23' In addition,
the Basic Law grants individuals the right to a court hearing. In the
Restatement Case, the Federal Constitutional Court declared that
right guaranteed individuals the opportunity to present their views onj . 232
the facts, enter petitions, and make statements. Although in some
cases, such as the case of arrest warrants, the court may take action
before a hearing is held with the subject present. In those cases,
"[ulpon request of the person concerned, subsequent proceedings must
be held in which he is heard and in which a decision as to the
lawfulness of the measures will be rendered."233
Under the Basic Law, the only exception to judicial review
234
regards the secrecy of mail and telecommunications. In special
security cases involving mail and telecommunications, the
Constitution (GG) permits the use of extraordinary measures that
attempt to balance national security interests while protecting basic
rights. In those cases, pursuant to Article 10(2) GG, the Parliament
may appoint a special body, typically a parliamentary committee,
which performs the judicial review function. The government must
inform that committee about surveillance measures on mail and
telephone communications and the committee must approve
235
surveillance measures installed on international communications.
In addition, under Article 10, there is a G-10 commission, which
236
consists of four deputies appointed by the parliamentary committee.
This commission reviews whether the surveillance measures are
237
necessary. While these committees are subject to some
accountability (i.e. annual reporting) there is no way for the
individuals who are the object of police surveillance to protest the
surveillance to the courts or to the committee.3 " In addition, given
that the new legislation expanded the federal government's
information gathering powers, the absence of judicial review in this
area raises the specter that individual liberties lack sufficient
231. GG art. 19(4).
232. MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 117, at 351.
233. BVerfGE 9, 89.
234. LEPSIUS, supra note 7, at 9.
235. Id. at 11-12,
236. Id. at 12.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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protection. Importantly, since the new legislation does not require
the federal agencies to inform the parliamentary committee of all
investigations, the committee's oversight function is limited to the
specific cases of which they are aware. 2 9  At the time that the
legislature considered the second anti-terrorism package, the German
Judges Federation declared that it is "particularly alarming" that the
federal investigative authorities' powers will be increased and that
they "will not be subject to judicial scrutiny."24 ° While comprehensive
public oversight may compromise the secrecy of government
investigations, the government's increased use of telecommunication
information to ferret out terrorists raises the risk that the
government will encroach upon individual liberties without the
public's knowledge.
Under the German Criminal Procedure Code
(Strafp rozessordnung, StPO), § 100f, the government can only use
personal data pursuant to police law for the purposes of criminal
proceedings and in "specific cases to avert an actual danger to the life,
"141
limb or liberty of another or to substantial property or assets.
Presumably, these provisions would prohibit the potential for abuse
allowed in U.S. courts with the government's increasing use of in
camera ex parte presentations of evidence to show that individuals
qualify as "enemy combatants" and are thus subject to indeterminate
military detention.
B. United States
1. Violations of Constitutional Rights
a. First Amendment
Both the 1996 Act and the Patriot Act implicate the rights to
free speech and free association protected under the First
Amendment. By broadening the definition of "terrorist" activity as
well as the definition of providing support to terrorists, the legislation
increases the probability that individuals who engage in protected
First Amendment conduct will be investigated and possibly criminally
punished. Moreover, in the case of non-citizens seeking to enter the
239. Id. at 12.
240. Elizabeth Zimmermann, German Parliament Agrees Second Anti-terrorism Law
Package, World Socialist Web Site, Dec. 5, 2001, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/
2001/dec2001/germ-d05.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
241. § 100f(1) StPO.
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country, the legislation permits the INS to exclude individuals on the
basis of their ideology. Section 411 of the Patriot Act allows the INS
to deny entry to non-citizens who are members of "a political, social or
other similar group whose public endorsement of acts... undermines
United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities."2 2
While, without question, the United States has a strong national
security interest in prohibiting supporters of al Qaeda from entering
the country, due to the broad nature of the war on terrorism, this
statute also empowers the INS to block peaceful protestors of the war
in Iraq from entering the country. Furthermore, the Act gives the
INS authority to deport individuals for mere association with a
terrorist group, regardless of whether or not there is any connection
between an individual's connections to terrorists and violent crime.243
Since the new INS regulations define "terrorist activity" as almost any
use or threatened use of a weapon and define a "terrorist group" as
two or more individuals who have used or threatened to use a weapon,
the regulations give the INS widespread latitude in its deportation
decisions.
Given that Attorney General Ashcroft has labeled critics of the
Patriot Act "unpatriotic" and charged them with "giving ammunition
to America's enemies, '2 44 it is not unreasonable to argue that these
provisions give law enforcement a license to resurrect the
investigative abuses of the past. The enactment of a similar act, the
Internal Security Act of 1950, prompted the growth of the FBI's
COINTELPRO operations (counterintelligence programs).24 Though
the purpose of the 1950 Act was to combat communism, the FBI
investigated a myriad of domestic political groups including civil
rights groups, the Socialist Workers Party, and groups protesting the
Vietnam War.246  A subsequent Senate investigation of these
activities, led by Senator Frank Church, concluded, "the Bureau
conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at
preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and
association, on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous
242. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 411(a).
243. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 966 (2002).
244. See Whitehead, supra note 69, at 1100 (citing Homeland Defense Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (written testimony of John
Ashcroft, Attorney General), available at http://www.senate.gov-judiciary/
print testimony.cfm?id+108&wit-id=42).
245. See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 52, at 73.
246. Id.
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groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the
national security and deter violence."247
Moreover, given that the government's primary emphasis is on
detecting and preventing future terrorist attacks, the prime impetus
behind law enforcement investigations will not be to gather
information for purposes of a criminal indictment, but rather to
gather any possible information related to terrorism. While criminal
investigative searches are bound by the requirements of "reasonable
suspicion" and "probable cause," the scope of investigations conducted
for the primary purpose of protecting national security may be
virtually limitless.
With few exceptions under American law, individuals can only be
punished for a criminal act that they commit, help another to commit,
or conspire to commit. When the 1996 Act made it a federal crime to
provide humanitarian support to "terrorist" organizations, it
reintroduced the principal of "guilt by association" into the federal
law.248 Under this statute, the government can prosecute people for
funding lawful acts sponsored by certain designated groups.249 While
we typically equate the term "terrorist" organization with al Qaeda or
similar groups, during the State Department's history of categorizing
groups, it has also placed such groups as Nelson Mandela's African
National Congress into that category. Had this law been in effect
during the 1980s, individuals who had given contributions to finance
Mandela's speaking tours could have been prosecuted.2 °
In the months following the September 11th attacks, student
demonstrators, global justice workers, civil libertarians, animal rights
and peace activists, were all characterized as terrorist
. . 251
sympathizers. Since the Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism
broadly, to include activities that seek "to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion," it threatens to categorize
First Amendment conduct as terrorist activity." Thus, the
broadening scope that constitutes terrorist activity, the liberal
application of the definition of a terrorist organization, and law
247. See id. at 73-74.
248. Id. at 118.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Patricia Williams, By Any Means Necessary, THE NATION, November 26, 2001,
available at httpJ/www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011126&s-williams (last
visited Nov. 7, 2003).
252. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 802(a)(5)(B)(ii).
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enforcement's changing mission may all challenge First Amendment
activities.
The most striking parallel between the German and American
legislation in this area is the broad similarity between the
criminalization of conduct related to speech and association which
may support terrorism. However, there are also important differences
in the criminalization of that conduct. In crafting the definition of
speech that constituted recruitment for a terrorist cause, German
legislators took stock of the lessons learned from the country's prior
legislative assault on terrorism in the 1970s. During the U.S.
Congress' expedited deliberations of the Patriot Act, there is little
evidence that legislators reflected upon the country's extensive
history of characterizing political dissent as criminal activity. This
difference may reflect how severely September 11th rocked the
country and politicians' eagerness to take action in the face of the
country's powerlessness to ameliorate the event's catastrophic impact.
In devising effective strategies to ferret out dangerous Islamic
extremists, while promoting religious freedom and not perpetuating
discrimination, both countries have had to confront different legacies.
Germany had to overcome its postwar reluctance to profile religious
organizations to broaden the scope of investigations based on
associational ties and set aside associational rights previously given
to fundamentalist Islamic groups. In contrast to the United States,
during this period Germany attempted to liberalize its immigration
policies. Although President Bush has condemned violence against
Muslims, the government's closer monitoring of aliens and increased
reporting requirements has resulted in large scale detentions of aliens
of Middle-Eastern descent.
Moreover it is an open question whether American law
enforcement agencies will use the terrorism's new reach to target
dissent. The fact that al Qaeda supporters belong to the Muslim
religion, and that some organizations marry humanitarian activities
with violent acts, could lead to constitutional violations if law
enforcement abuses its wider mandate. In addition, some of the Bush
Administration's rhetoric against both countries and individuals that
have opposed their policies has called into question the
Administration's commitment to tolerate dissent.
b. Fourth Amendment
A key provision of the Patriot Act may exempt a number of
searches conducted pursuant to the war on terrorism from the
probable cause requirement. Although the government is prohibited
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by the Fourth Amendment from conducting searches or wiretaps
unless it has probable cause to believe that an individual is engaged
in criminal activity or possesses evidence of a crime, the Patriot Act
waives that requirement when the government can show that the
investigation has a "significant" foreign intelligence purpose.253 In an
effort to protect the secrecy of government investigations related to
foreign intelligence and still subject those investigations to some form
of judicial review, in 1978 Congress established the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.2 4 The 1978 Act allowed the FBI to
conduct surveillance and secret searches for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence information, in the absence of specific probable
cause that an individual was engaged in criminal activity, after they
applied for and received an order from the FISA court.255 In order to
obtain a FISA warrant, law enforcement had to demonstrate that the
primary purpose of an investigation was to collect foreign intelligence
21
rather than to pursue criminal law enforcement. 6At the time the
legislation was enacted, a House report defined "foreign intelligence
information" as evidence of "crimes relating to sabotage, international
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities.
The Patriot Act's amendment of the FISA statute relaxes the
requirement that the government show the primary purpose of an
investigation is not to pursue criminal prosecution. While Congress
amended FISA to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA
warrant in those cases where an individual may be a source of foreign
intelligence and the target of a criminal investigation, the amendment
makes it easier for the FBI to use the FISA court, rather than
ordinary federal courts, to obtain warrants for information that may
be used in criminal investigations.
The comparison between the impact of the expanded information
gathering powers granted under the new legislative packages in
Germany and the U.S. is an interesting one. It appears that in many
cases related to national security, Germany's law enforcement forces
will be able to expand the scope of their investigations, if they can
show that the investigations are related to national security. To the
extent that there is oversight of these investigations, it is oversight by
253. Cole, supra note 243, at 972-73.
254. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1862 (1978).
255. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 52, at 159-60.
256. Cole, supra note 243, at 974.
257. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 724 (2002) (citing H.R. REP No. 95-1283, at 49
(1978)).
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a special parliamentary committee, rather than by a court. The
increasing centralization of investigative ability and the expected
increase in the number of investigations may improve Germany's
ability to monitor terrorists, but it will also make oversight more
difficult and less effective. Here again, Germany has had to relax
some of their statutory protections that were enacted as a response to
the rise of the Nazi regime, in an attempt to counter the new level of
threat posed by terrorism.
The U.S. Justice Department has attempted to bypass the
judicial oversight, typically exercised by the federal courts over its
investigative activities, by enlarging opportunity to obtain warrants
from the FISA courts. While an argument can be made that the
jurisdiction of the FISA courts should be expanded to include
terrorists with foreign ties, if the primary purpose of the enhanced
secrecy of the FISA courts is to facilitate the gathering of intelligence,
one way to accomplish that goal and ensure that the FBI does not use
the FISA courts rather than ordinary federal courts to obtain
warrants for information that may be used in criminal investigations
is to institute an exclusionary rule. The rule would prohibit the FBI
from using information obtained pursuant to a FISA warrant in a
criminal prosecution. Congress' failure to add reasonable protections
to the Patriot Act and ignorance of the FBI's legacy of using
investigations to monitor political dissent may reflect the haste in
which the Patriot Act was enacted, rather than a deliberated
consideration of the threat posed by terrorism.
The net result of the changes in both countries is that, although
the constitutional requirements restricting the investigative activities
of federal law enforcement authorities in both countries have been
loosened, it is too early to tell whether investigative agencies in either
country will direct their newly enhanced power against inappropriate
targets.
c. Fifth Amendment
In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the government
arrested and held over 1,000 individuals without filing formal
criminal charges against them.2  While the government has invoked
section 412 of the Patriot Act, which allows the Attorney General to
take into custody any alien whom he '%as reasonable grounds to
believe"25 19 threatens national security, indefinite detention jeopardizes
258. Williams, supra note 251.
259. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 412.
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an individual's right to due process. Although the rights of aliens are
limited by immigration power, this power is subject to constitutional
limitations. In the recent case, Zadvydas v. Davis, not involving
suspected terrorists, the Supreme Court held that the indefinite
detention of aliens violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause.2 0 Unfortunately section 412, which grants the Attorney
General the power to hold aliens for periods of up to six months and to
extend those periods of detention if the alien threatens the security of
the community, also restricts aliens' access to the judicial system.26'
Additionally, under section 412(b)(3), the final deportation order may
only be reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.262
d. Sixth Amendment
Despite the fact that Congress granted the Justice Department a
wide range of new tools to combat terrorism in the Patriot Act, the
government has acquired some of its most constitutionally troubling
tools not by statutory authorization, but rather by executive fiat. On
October 30, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft unilaterally issued an
executive regulation that allows federal agents to monitor
conversations that occur in detention facilities. Pursuant to this
regulation, the determination of what conversations will be monitored
will not be made by judges upon an objective showing of reasonable
suspicion, but rather on Ashcroft's own determination of reasonable
suspicion.263 Although inmates have a lower expectation of privacy
while they are incarcerated, Ashcroft's executive order threatens to
undermine the right to effective representation by circumscribing the
ability of individuals to confer confidentially with their counsel .
The Supreme Court and other federal courts have long recognized the
260. 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
261. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 412(a).
262. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 412(b)(3).
263. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, The New Regulation Allowing Federal
Agents to Monitor Attorney-Client Conversations: Why it Threatens Fourth
Amendment Values, Findlaw's Legal Commentary, Nov. 16, 2001, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011116.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
264. See Letter from Patrick Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, to John
Ashcroft, Attorney General (Nov. 9, 2001), at http://www.senate.gov/-leahy/
press/200111/110901.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
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integral role that confidential communications play in guaranteeing
the right to counsel.2 5
Since Germany's system of justice is an inquisitorial one, German
lawyers do not play a role comparable to a lawyer's role in the
American adversarial system. As a result, it may not be surprising
that Germany's effort to detect terrorism has not similarly affected
German defense counsel. However, the German government's
reluctance to interfere with defense counsel may not completely
reflect the inquisitorial nature of the judicial system, but rather the
fact that there was considerable debate about restrictions on defense
attorneys during Germany's prior bout with terrorism. Attempts to
circumscribe the role of defense counsel in terrorist proceedings
occurred in several German courts during the 1970s, when the state
sought to exclude defense counsel from specific trials. While the
exclusion of one attorney was reversed by the Federal Constitutional
Court,2 66 in 1975, the German parliament enacted a defense counsel
exclusion statute that enabled courts and prosecutors to exclude
267defense counsel from trial under certain conditions. The Federal
Constitutional Court responded by striking down the statute, holding
•• •• 268
that it lacked adequate standards to guide its application. The
Bundestag subsequently drafted a more precise statute.
2. The Executive Branch as Judge: Circumventing the
Constitution Through the Use of "Enemy Combatant" Status
In order to benefit from the criminal law's basic procedural
protections, one must be considered a criminal defendant. The
process of invoking constitutional protections such as the right to
counsel, the right to remain silent, as well as the protections afforded
by probable cause requirements, presumes that the government has
filed criminal charges. In fact, more often than not, if the government
obtains evidence unlawfully, the remedy is not that the government is
sanctioned, but rather that the court rules the evidence inadmissible
in the criminal proceeding against the defendant. The judicial
branch's reluctance to sanction the executive branch helped to spawn
265. Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 383 U.S. 293, 306 (1966); Shillinger v.
Hayworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 1995); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951)).
266. RADVANYI, supra note 4, at 79.
267. Id.
268. KOMMERS, supra note 100, at 235, 564 n.ll0 (citing BVerfGE 49, 24).
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the creation of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.269
By implication, if the government does not file criminal charges
against individuals held in detention, few constitutional restraints
may regulate the conditions of confinement. The war on terrorism
has produced an interesting paradox. Although the government has
indicted a number of individuals in federal court, including
individuals suspected of being active members of terrorist cells, eight
individuals have been classified as "enemy combatants. 270  While
those charged in federal court will enjoy the full benefits of the
adversarial process and a criminal trial, those labeled as "enemy
combatants" may be stripped of their constitutional rights.
By designating some detainees as "enemy combatants," the
Executive Branch has unilaterally awarded itself a license to subject
detainees to coercive conditions of confinement and cut them off from
contact with the outside world. The fact that the country is now at
war has strongly influenced judicial decision-making, as the existence
of wartime conditions was a decisive factor in the Padilla court's
decision to grant the President considerable latitude in its designation
of "enemy combatants."271 The court reasoned that, during war and in
cases involving national security, the judicial system typically accords
the Executive Branch a wide range of discretion and determined that
the President's power to detain unlawful combatants flowed from his
269. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 2.01 (2d ed. 1986).
270. The first two of those cases have provoked court challenges. On June 23, 2003
President Bush designated Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri as an enemy combatant
alleging that he was an al Qaeda sleeper agent. See Jerry Markon, Jailing of Hamdi
Upheld as Rehearing is Denied, WASH. POST, July 10, 2003, at A10. On July 3, 2003,
President Bush designated six more individuals currently being detained by the
United States as "enemy combatants" clearing the way for the six individuals to face
military tribunals. See Press Release, President Determines Enemy Combatants
Subject to His Military Order, U.S. Department of Defense (July 3, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html (last visited Nov 5,
2003). When it became apparent that the group contained two British citizens, the
European Union as well as the U.K. protested the classification and warned that
applying the death penalty to the suspects could undermine European support for the
war on terrorism. See Jimmy Burns & Jean Eaglesham, UK to Confront US Over
Secret Tribunals, FIN. TIMES (London), July 5, 2003, at 1. To appease the British, the
U.S. agreed that it would not seek the death penalty for the two British detainees.
See Hugh Williamson, U.S. Concessions on Guatanamo Likely to be 'Problematic', FIN.
TIMES (London), July 30, 2003, at 6.
271. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 606 (S.D.N.Y.2002).
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duties as Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, the court applied Justice
Jackson's analysis of the degrees of Presidential authority in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,272 stating, "[i]n the decision
to detain Padilla as an unlawful combatant.., the President is
operating at maximum authority, under both the Constitution and the
Joint Resolution."2 4
The court's deference to Presidential authority in the Padilla case
has been matched in the second enemy combatant case, Hamdi v.
275Rumsfeld. While the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied
the government's Motion to Dismiss a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and rejected the government's argument that the President's
determination of Hamdi's status as an enemy combatant was not
276
subject to judicial review, in a January 2003 decision, the Court
held that Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention as an enemy
combatant and the government's affidavit was sufficient to establish a
basis for detention.277  Although the district court ordered the
government to produce more evidence to support the government's
decision to classify Hamdi as an enemy combatant, the Fourth
Circuit Court held that the fact that Hamdi had been captured in a
zone of active combat was sufficient in and of itself to justify Hamdi's
detention as an "enemy combatant."279
Moreover, while the district court attempted to delineate a
meaningful standard of judicial review that would apply to the
executive branch's decisions to designate individuals as enemy
combatants, the Fourth Circuit struck down that standard of
• 280
review. According to the district court, a meaningful judicial review
should determine:
(1) Whether the government's classification of the detainee's status
was determined pursuant to appropriate authority to make such
determinations.
272. Id. at 606.
273. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
274. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
275. 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
276. Id. at 283.
277. 316 F.3d 450, 474 (4th Cir. 2003).
278. Respondent's Motion for Relief, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (No. 2:02ev439), available at
http://news.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums0805O2gmot.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2003).
279. Hamdi, 316 F. 3d at 473.
280. Id. at 467.
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(2) Whether the screening criteria used to make and maintain the
classification of an American born detainee held in the continental
United States met sufficient procedural requirements as to be
consistent with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
(3) On what basis has the government determined that the
continuing detention of Hamdi without charges and without access
to counsel serves national security. 28
In setting aside those provisions and ordering the district court to
dismiss Hamdi's habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit determined that
Congress' "Authorization for the Use of Military Force," enacted on
September 18, 2001, invested the President with the power to detain
those captured during a period of hostilities.28 2  That legislation
authorized the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks... or
harbored such organizations or persons .... ,,3 Moreover, the Court
argued that the judiciary must defer to the political branches in
deciding "cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy,
national security, or military affairs,"2 84 because to trespass on those
powers would infringe "the right to self-determination and self-
governance" at a time when the country's defense is critical.2 8 5 The
Court also reflected on the status of constitutional rights during
wartime:
The safeguards that all Americans have come to expect in criminal
prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena of armed conflict.
In fact, if deference to the executive is not exercised with respect to
military judgments in the field, it is difficult to see where deference
would ever obtain .... As we emphasized in our prior decision, any
judicial inquiry into Hamdi's status as an alleged enemy combatant
in Afghanistan must reflect this deference as well as "a recognition
281. Respondent's Motion for Relief, supra note 278, at 9.
282. Hamdi, 316 F. 3d at 467.
283. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
284. Hamdi, 316 F. 3d at 463 (citing Hamdi H1, 296 F.3d at 281).
285. Id. at 465.
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that government has no more profound responsibility" than the
protection of American citizens from further terrorist attacks.
28 6
Thus, while the national legislatures in both Germany and the
U.S. expanded the power of the executive branch to pursue terrorists,
the greatest difference between the two responses to terrorism is the
scope of the power that the U.S. Congress has granted to the
President to combat terrorism. The Congressional authorization
giving the President the power "to use all necessary and appropriate
force" has dramatically shifted the balance of power in the United
States' separation of powers scheme. To date, federal courts have
interpreted that authorization as a mandate for the judiciary to defer
to the President in his role of Commander-in-Chief. While the war on
terrorism may represent a new kind of war against a non-nation-
state, the judiciary has failed to craft a standard of judicial review
that may be better suited to this new threat, rather than the
traditional carte blanche granted to the President in traditional wars.
In this instance, the body of American constitutional jurisprudence
that has developed during prior periods of war may prove to be ill-
suited precedent to balancing national interests during the current
hostilities.
The individuals who stand to experience the greatest loss of
rights will be those designated by President Bush as "enemy
combatants." Given that, to date, that designation has only been
applied to two people, the largest number of individuals who will be
detained with more limited rights are likely to be aliens, who will be
subject to deportation because the Attorney General has single-
handedly determined they represent a threat to community security.
286. Id. at 465 (citing Hamdi 11, 296 F.3d at 283). On July 9, 2003, the Fourth
Circuit, by an 8-4 vote denied the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing
en banc filed on Hamdi's behalf by his father and a group of more than one-hundred
law professors and legal organizations. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir.
2003). In her dissent, Judge Diana Motz stated that: "[flor more than a year, a United
States citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, has been labeled an enemy combatant and held in
solitary confinement in a Norfolk, Virginia naval brig. He was not been charged with
a crime, let alone convicted of one. The Executive will not state when, if ever, he will
be released. Nor has the Executive allowed Hamdi to appear in court, consult with
counsel, or communicate with the outside world. .. .To justify forfeiture of a citizen's
constitutional rights, the Executive must establish enemy combatant status with
more than hearsay. In holding to the contrary, the panel allows appropriate
deference to the Executive's authority in matters of war to eradicate the Judiciary's
own Constitutional role: protection of the individual freedoms guaranteed by all
citizens." Id. at 368.
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In the context of the current U.N. debate on Iraq, it is often
mentioned that Europe is more leery of war than the U.S. Certainly
the closest that America has ever come to experiencing the extent of
the destruction that Germany experienced during World War II would
be the Civil War, which is beyond the reach of the country's current
collective memory. Ironically, a key historical factor that has shaped
both countries' responses to terrorism may be the differences in our
experiences of national devastation. While September 11th caused
Congress and the President to view legal policy through a wartime
lens, the devastation that Germany experienced during World War II
caused German politicians to reject war as the appropriate response
to terrorism, As a result, the German balance of separation of powers
has been less disrupted by the country's legislative response.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES IN A TIME OF
TERROR
Germany and the United States have responded to the common
threat posed by global terrorism in ways that have been profoundly
shaped by historical forces, the role of political institutions, and each
state's vision of the nature of human freedom and dignity.
Ultimately, the unique confluence of those factors in each country will
determine how well each state balances the security threat posed by
terrorism with each state's commitment to preserve human rights.
While terrorism poses a threat to human life that cannot be
underestimated given the loss of nearly 3,000 lives on September
11th, government action in both countries threatens to alter the
balance between the role of the individual, and individual rights in
society, with the government.
The United States decision to respond to September 11th by
declaring war has resulted in the sharpest distinctions between legal
changes in both countries. The decision to declare war has, to date,
empowered the President to label a number of suspected terrorists as
"enemy combatants" and hold them incommunicado indefinitely,
without the threat or protection of criminal charges. While such a
strategy may improve the ability of law enforcement to gather
valuable intelligence, it threatens to shield government action from
judicial review. Moreover, by electing to detain large numbers of
individuals outside the United States, the U.S. has sought to deny the
detainees access to U.S. courts. As challenges to this exercise of
executive power proceed through the federal court system, it remains
to be seen how much deference the judicial branch will ultimately
2003]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
grant the executive branch. The fact that, in the context of war,
government power in the U.S. is not subject to significant
constitutional constraints, unless the legislative and executive
branches are willing to constrain themselves, may prove to be the
most salient difference between the German and American responses
to terrorism.
In terms of the actual legislative packages enacted by both
countries, there are similarities in the broad objectives of the
legislation. Both countries have enacted measures that expand the
definition of terrorism and broaden what it means to provide criminal
support for terrorism. Both countries have made it a crime to provide
humanitarian aid to organizations engaged in terrorist activities.
These broadening definitions increase the risk that law enforcement
will use these new tools to target political dissenters. In both
countries, law enforcement agencies in the past have shown varying
proclivities to interpret their investigative mandate, overzealously
prompting legislative responses.
In both Germany and the United States, legislatures took steps to
exempt law enforcement search-and-seizure activity related to foreign
intelligence from ordinary judicial review by expanding existing
legislation. In the U.S., this expansion occurred by broadening the
definition of cases that law enforcement may take to the FISA courts.
In Germany, the legislature loosened the oversight of those activities
provided by a parliamentary committee. Given the differences in
institutional mandates, it is likely that far fewer cases will escape the
review of ordinary courts in Germany, although those that do will
only be subject to the review of a parliamentary committee.
The U.S. took an additional step to restrict judicial review with
respect to cases involving aliens. Not only did Congress expand the
Attorney General's authority to detain aliens by allowing detention
under a standard of reasonable suspicion he is virtually free to
construe as he wishes, Congress also severely restricted aliens' access
to the judicial system. In the immediate aftermath of September
11th, the government detained over 1000 aliens. While most of those
aliens were eventually released in mid-December 2002, the
government detained hundreds of aliens living in Southern California
who had reported to INS offices to comply with new fingerprinting
regulations. Despite the black mark left on American history by the
detention of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the INS has
not hesitated to strictly enforce its new powers. In balancing the
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legacy of Korematsu8 7 with the fact that several of the September
11th hijackers entered or resided in the country illegally, the Justice
Department has tipped the balance in favor of enhancing domestic
security.
In contrast, while Germany has tightened restrictions governing
asylum, it has resisted efforts to detain and deport large numbers of
foreign residents. In determining how to respond to terrorism,
Germany has had to weigh a desire to counter the legacy of abuse
inflicted by Nazis against religious groups with a desire to ferret out
Islamic groups that may be sponsoring terrorism. Germany has
attempted to strike that balance by tightening restrictions on the
ability of religious groups to seek protected constitutional status. The
mere claim that they are a religious organization no longer protects
the rights of fundamentalists to organize. A key tool in Germany's
arsenal has been the government's longstanding ability to ban groups
that threaten the federal democratic order according to the concept of
militant democracy. The government has already used the lifting of
the religious restriction to ban several fundamentalist Islamic groups.
Beyond these differences in the scope of the response to
terrorism, as well as the particular content of the legislative changes,
a key arbiter of the shape of change will be Germany's Federal
Constitutional Court and the federal courts in the United States.
While both of these institutions have created legacies of protecting
rights, differences in how each state's constitutional jurisprudence
defines and enforces rights may lead to some profound differences in
how both institutions construe rights in a time of terror. Since
Germany places human dignity at the apex of its basic values, there is
a well defined endpoint which the government cannot violate as it
investigates, detains, prosecutes, and punishes terrorists. Under
German law, the death penalty is unconstitutional, 2 8 and the use of a
polygraph machine is considered an affront to human dignity because
it treats human beings as a means to an end.8 9
Whatever the state's security interests, the importance of human
dignity and Germany's stronger emphasis on rehabilitation in the
sentencing process place stronger restraints on Germany's efforts to
punish terrorists. As a point of comparison, the German court that
recently found Mounir El Motassadeq guilty of more than 3,000
counts of accessory to murder and membership in a terrorist
287. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
288. GG art. 102.
289. KOMMERS, supra note 100, at 305, 574 n.15.
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organization for his role in providing logistical support to the
September 11th hijackers sentenced him to the maximum sentence
available, fifteen years.290 While it is extremely rare for a defendant
to receive the maximum sentence in Germany, and the sentence even
surprised some German prosecutors, the sentence was lenient by
American standards for an individual who challenges the charges• "1291
against him and takes his case to trial. In another German case,
the Jordanian national, Shadi Moh'd Mustafa Abdallah, who was
detained in Germany in April 2002, and accused of planning terrorist
attacks, faces a maximum ten-year sentence if convicted 2
In contrast, American John Lindh, who pled guilty to supplying
services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive during the
commission of a felony, received a twenty year prison term and could1 93
have faced the death penalty had he been found guilty at trial.
There can be little doubt that those individuals accused of terrorist
actions in the United States, who are fortunate to receive a criminal
trial, will receive longer sentences than individuals charged with
similar crimes in Germany. The government is seeking the death• 294
penalty against Zacarias Moussaoui. In another prominent
American terrorism case that was resolved by plea agreement, the
defendant lyman Faris, faces a maximum twenty-year prison
sentence under the terms of his plea agreement. Faris, the Ohio
290. 9/11 Terrorist Gets Maximum Sentence, GERMAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON D.C.,
Feb. 21, 2003, at http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/publications/week/2003/
030221/politics2.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
291. First Guilty Verdict in Sept. 11 Terrorism Case, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Feb. 20, 2003,
available at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432 A_782772_lA,00.html
(last visited on Nov. 9, 2003).
292. Terror Suspect Trial Begins in Germany, DEUTSCHE WELLE, June 24, 2003,
available at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1430_A_900864_1_A,00.html
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003). Abdallah's trial began in June 2003. German prosecutors
have accused him of being a member of an al-Tawhid terrorist cell that was allegedly
planning to attack people in a busy square of a German city. Id. In July 2003,
Abdallah admitted in court that he had undergone training in Afghanistan in bomb-
making and that he had participated in planning terrorist attacks. See German
Politician Calls for Tougher Anti-Terror Law, DEUTSCHE WELLE, July 5, 2003,
available at http://www.dw-world.de/englisb/0,3367,1432_A_912527_1_A,00.html
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
293. Plea Agreement, United State v. Lindh (No. 02-37A), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindhluslindh7l502pleaag.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2003).
294. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. Moussaoui (No. 03-4162),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss62603opn.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
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truck driver who pled guilty to conspiracy as well as providing
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization,
assisted al Qaeda by "researching and providing information about
ultralights, extending travel tickets, researching gas cutters, asking
other individuals about gas cutters, surveying a target (the bridge)
and then reporting his assessment [to al Qaeda] ....
The appropriate yardstick of sentences for individuals convicted
in the United States of terrorist acts that result in death is perhaps
the sentences invoked against Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols
who planned and executed the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that
killed 168 people. Timothy McVeigh, who was convicted of murder
under a 1994 anti-terrorism law, was sentenced to death and
subsequently executed. A federal judge sentenced Terry Nichols, who
was convicted of conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and
involuntary manslaughter, to life in prison without parole. Finally,
Michael Fortier, who failed to warn authorities of the attack, was
sentenced to a twelve-year prison term.
In the United States, the fact that many rights require the
existence of a criminal proceeding to invoke, may mean that the
rights of enemy combatants and detainees will only be protected by a
"shocks the conscience" standard. At the same time, the fact that the
United States has an adversarial system of justice and a host of public
interest law organizations profoundly affects the battle between the
government and citizens over the protection of constitutional rights.
The American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and a host of other groups have already
challenged government action, even in the restrictive FISA courts.
That the government has attempted to use the doctrine of standing to
limit challenges filed by these organizations is a testament to the
important role that they play in asserting constitutional claims.
However, the fact that the political system is the primary instrument
for controlling democratic states will ensure that the battle over civil
liberties may not ultimately be settled in the courtroom, but rather at
the polls. In Germany, the contours of dissent will be shaped by the
country's proliferation of political parties, as well as by law professors,
who have played a historic role in the development of the law. In
295. Plea Agreement, United States v. Faris, available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/faris/usfaris603plea.pdf; Statement of Facts, United States v. Faris,
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/faris/ usfaris603sof.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2003).
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addition, large anti-war protests in both countries underscore the
importance of public opinion as a check on government power.
The interaction of these diverse influences will ultimately shape
how each state balances their concerns for security with the
protection of liberties. Despite the forces of globalization in the
economic sphere and the proliferation of cooperative agreements to
combat terrorism in the international arena, dramatic differences will
continue to exist between each countries' response to terrorism.
History, culture, and the structure of political institutions have
strongly shaped these differences. Ultimately, however, judicial
systems will weigh the need for security with the desire to protect
fundamental constitutional values and cast their own imprint on
these responses.
